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Introduction 
In certain countries households avoid placing their money on bank accounts because, 
they simply do not trust the stability and efficiency of national banking system. The capital 
flows in such countries between lenders and borrowers are flawed. Banks cannot carry out 
their principal function – to collect and distribute efficiently capital in the economy. 
International regulators, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) have a 
primary duty to produce recommendations to increase the soundness of national banking 
systems and, as a consequence, to stringent an overall world financial sector stability. Recent 
financial crises showed that the turmoil in the banking industry immediately spills over the 
sector and dramatically affects the overall economic stability. Over the past twenty years, the 
banking regulation was evaluating around two distinct trends: capital adequacy requirements 
and closer “supervisory monitoring” of bank business activities (Tarullo, 2008). These trends 
converge in Basel II New Capital Accord (BCBS, 2004a) released by BCBS in 2004 and 
implemented in near one hundred countries in 2008. This document, compared to its 
predecessor, Basel I Capital Accord issued in 1988 (BCBS, 1988), contains a much more 
“expansive set of recommendations” (Barth, Caprio Jr, & Levine, 2008). The first pillar of 
Basel II, probably the most developed and the most important, sets the rules and approaches 
to determine the minimum capital levels that banks should have to preserve their solvency. 
Together with the minimum capital requirements, Basel II requires banks to satisfy precisely 
defined qualitative standards for risk management. Among others, banks that intend to 
implement the advanced risk measurement approaches should convince their supervisors that 
a) their board of directors and senior management are actively involved in the risk 
management framework; b) their risk management system is closely integrated in day-to-day 
operations; and c) they have a regular communication of risk exposures and loss experience to 
business managers (BCBS, 2004a).  
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 The rationales of these rules are: a) to protect national economies against financial 
distress; b) to reduce the information asymmetry between bank shareholders and depositors; 
and c) to preserve a certain market discipline (Berger, Herring, & Szegö, 1995). The 
efficiency of such capital regulation was always of a big interest for practitioners and 
researchers (Barth, Caprio Jr, & Levine, 2004; Ciháck & Schaeck, 2010; Jacques & Nigro, 
1997). Researchers’ findings on this subject diverge drastically. While stringent capital 
requirements are associated with less non-performing loans (Barth et al., 2004) and greater 
cost efficiency (Pasiouras, Tanna, & Zopounidis, 2009), several studies suggest that they are 
not robustly linked with the stability of the banking system (Barth et al., 2008; González, 
2005). Jacques and Nigro (1997) and Shrieves et al. (1992) stress that risk-sensitive capital 
standards are the efficient tools to increase capital ratios and to reduce an excessive risk-
taking in commercial banks. In contrast, Rime (2001) infers that regulatory pressures are 
positively related with bank level of capital, but have no impact on its risk-taking strategies.  
Contrarily, the qualitative side of bank risk management has not attracted much 
attention from academicians. Nevertheless, several studies had made a first attempt to assess 
how the compliance with Basel II core principles in their qualitative dimension affects bank 
behaviour (Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid, 2011; Ellul & Yerramilli, 2010; Gatzert, Schmeiser, & 
Schuckmann, 2008). These studies outline the importance of the bank risk management 
systems for future performance. Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) report, that the bank attention to 
its risk management function is paid-off by lowering its overall risk of default by restraining 
an excessive risk-taking. Aebi et al. (2011) suggest that the presence of chief risk officer 
reporting directly to the board of directors is positively associated with bank performance, 
measured by stock returns and returns on bank equity. One of potential problems to conduct 
the research on this topic is the lack of risk management information. The Pillar 3 of Basel II 
stating the rules for risk management information disclosures is one “the least developed” 
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(Barth et al., 2008) and is not uniformly understood by banks. Banks’ reporting on risk 
management differs considerably from one unit to another especially if banks are 
headquartered in different countries and depend on different national rules. Despite of these 
difficulties, all these topics are relevant and should be investigated more precisely. 
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Thesis outline 
This thesis is based on three independent essays about risk management in financial 
institutions. The aim of this dissertation is to bring some empirical evidence on how bank risk 
management systems behave under the pressure of external regulation, whether the 
sophistication in risk management impact positively bank solvency and market valuation, and 
to what extent the compliance with the current regulation is efficient to predict bank future 
performance. The main regulation rules on which we grounded this dissertation are Basel II 
New Capital Accord mentioned above. The Figure 1 gives a general idea on the interrelation 
of different components used in this work. Then, I present under the form of abstracts 
accompanied by graphical illustrations (Figure 1.2., Figure 1.3., and Figure 1.4.) the main 
ideas of each essay. 
 
Figure 1: All components used in the dissertation empirical analyses. 
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Essay 1 
The choice to adopt risk-sensitive measurement approaches for operational 
risks: the case of Advanced Measurement Approach under Basel II New Capital 
Accord 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the choice of the operational risk approach under Basel II 
requirements and whether the adoption of advanced risk measurement approaches allows 
banks to save capital. Among the three possible approaches for operational risk measurement, 
the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) is the most sophisticated and requires the use 
of historical loss data, the application of statistical tools, and the engagement of a highly 
qualified staff. Our results provide evidence that the adoption of AMA is contingent on the 
availability of bank resources and prior experience in risk-sensitive operational risk 
measurement practices. Moreover, banks that choose AMA exhibit low requirements for 
capital and, as a result might gain a competitive advantage compared to banks that opt for less 
sophisticated approaches. 
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Figure 1.2.: The components used in empirical analysis in the first chapter of the dissertation. 
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Essay 2 
Internal Risk Controls and their Impact on Bank Solvency 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent cases in financial sector showed the importance of risk management controls on 
risk taking and firm performance. Despite advances in the design and implementation of risk 
management mechanisms, there is little research on their impact on behavior and performance 
of firms. Based on data from a sample of 88 banks covering the period between 2004 and 
2010, we provide evidence that internal risk controls impact the solvency of banks. In 
addition, our results show that the level of internal risk controls leads to a higher degree of 
solvency in banks with a major shareholder in contrast to widely-held banks. However, the 
relationship between internal risk controls and bank solvency is negatively affected by BHC 
growth strategies and external restrictions on bank activities, while the higher regulatory 
requirements for bank capital moderates positively this relationship. 
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Figure 1.3.: The components used in empirical analysis in the second chapter of the 
dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
21
Essay 3 
The Impact of the Sophistication of Risk Measurement Approaches 
under Basel II on Bank Holding Companies Value  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Previous research showed the importance of external regulation on banks’ behavior. 
Some inefficient standards may accentuate risk-taking in banks and provoke a financial crisis. 
Despite the growing literature on the potential effects of Basel II rules, there is little empirical 
research on the efficiency of risk-sensitive capital measurement approaches and their impact 
on bank profitability and market valuation. Based on data from a sample of 66 banks covering 
the period between 2008 and 2010, we provide evidence that prudential ratios computed 
under Basel II standards predict the value of banks. However, this relation is contingent on 
the degree of sophistication of risk measurement approaches that banks apply. Capital ratios 
are effective in predicting bank market valuation when banks adopt the advanced approaches 
to compute the value of their risk-weighted assets. 
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Figure 1.4.: The components used in empirical analysis in the third chapter of the dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
23
References 
 
 
Aebi, V., Sabato, G., & Schmid, M. 2011. Risk management, corporate governance, and bank 
performance in the financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance(0). 
 
Barth, J. R., Caprio Jr, G., & Levine, R. 2004. Bank regulation and supervision: what works 
best? Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13(2): 205-248. 
 
Barth, J. R., Caprio Jr, G., & Levine, R. 2008. Rethinking bank regulation. Till angels 
govern. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
BCBS. 1988. International convergence of capiatal measurement and capital standards, Bank 
for International Settlements. Basel Switzerland. 
 
BCBS. 2004. International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: a 
revised framework. . In B. f. I. Settlements (Ed.). 
 
Berger, A. N., Herring, R. J., & Szegö, G. P. 1995. The role of capital in financial institutions. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 19(3-4): 393-430. 
 
Ciháck, M. & Schaeck, K. 2010. How well do aggregate prudential ratios identify banking 
system problems? Journal of Financial Stability, 6(3): 130-144. 
 
Ellul, A. & Yerramilli, V. 2010. Stronger risk controls, lower risk: evidence from U.S. bank 
holding companies, NBER working paper, 16178. 
 
Gatzert, N., Schmeiser, H., & Schuckmann, S. 2008. Enterprise risk management in financial 
groups: analysis of risk concentration and default risk. Financial Markets and 
Portfolio Management, 22(3): 241-258. 
 
González, F. 2005. Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison 
of bank risk. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(5): 1153-1184. 
 
Jacques, K. & Nigro, P. 1997. Risk-based capital, portfolio risk, and bank capital: A 
simultaneous equations approach. Journal of Economics and Business, 49(6): 533-
547. 
 
Pasiouras, F., Tanna, S., & Zopounidis, C. 2009. The impact of banking regulations on banks' 
cost and profit efficiency: Cross-country evidence. International Review of Financial 
Analysis, 18(5): 294-302. 
 
Rime, B. 2001. Capital requirements and bank behaviour: Empirical evidence for 
Switzerland. Journal of Banking & Finance, 25(4): 789-805. 
 
Shrieves, R. E. & Dahl, D. 1992. The relationship between risk and capital in commercial 
banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 16(2): 439-457. 
 
Tarullo, D. K. 2008. Banking on Basel. The future of international financial regulation. 
Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
  
24
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
25
Essay 1: 
The choice to adopt risk-sensitive measurement approaches for operational 
risks: the case of Advanced Measurement Approach under Basel II New 
Capital Accord 
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1. Introduction 
As a major provider of external finance to economic agents, banks play a central role in 
the financial intermediation. But today, they are no longer alone in this business. Over the last 
thirty years, globalization and technological progress decreased the cost advantage of banks in 
acquiring funds and engendered new types of players such as hedge funds and private equity 
firms (Edwards & Mishkin, 1995). To defend their competitive positions, banks responded in 
two major ways. First, they expanded their traditional lending activities to less creditworthy 
borrowers. Second, they developed new, fee-based activities. All these changes made the 
banking sector more fragile, increasing existing credit risks and creating new types of risks 
related to a growing sophistication of banking operations. In these circumstances, the major 
challenge posed to regulators is twofold: the need to secure the banking system from systemic 
crisis while letting it to evolve like other industries. Recent financial crisis showed that it is 
not a trivial task. Inappropriate regulations might not be only inefficient, but could also have 
counterproductive effects (Barth, Caprio Jr, & Levine, 2001; Barth et al., 2004).  
Nowadays, regulators concentrate their efforts around two dimensions: the restrictions 
on activities that banks may engage in, and the minimum capital requirements that banks 
should possess (Besanko & Kanatas, 1996; Boyd, Chang, & Smith, 1998). Although national 
regulatory bodies adopted the prescriptions of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), the activity restriction rules remain to a large extent different from one country to 
another. According to Barth et al. (2008), these restrictions relate primarily to securities 
trading, insurance operations and real estate activities in a large number of countries. 
Restrictions have always attracted the academic interest and numerous studies were conducted 
to assess and compare the effectiveness of various national supervisory systems on bank 
behavior, profitability, and risk (Fernandez & Gonzalez, 2005; Laeven & Levine, 2009; 
Pasiouras et al., 2009). Generally, empirical findings suggest that more restrictive regulations, 
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at least, have no desirable impact on risk-taking of banks. Capital regulation is another 
dimension of banking supervision. With the Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), minimum capital 
standards for internationally active banks were for the first time stated. It offered an 
unsophisticated approach for the measurement of bank credit risk exposures. The introduction 
of this capital accord was generally considered as an important step forward in banking 
regulation. Nevertheless, academic research suggests that its main objective to diminish the 
probability of systemic crisis was not attained (Calem & Rob, 1999; Rime, 2001). Following 
some amendments of Basel I, including the capital requirements for market risk, Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) released in 2004 the Basel II New Capital 
Accord, formally called “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: A Revised Framework” (BCBS, 2004b). This document addressed three types of 
risk - credit risk, market risk and operational risk - and is structured of three pillars: 1) 
Minimum risk-based capital requirements; 2) Supervisory review of an institution’s capital 
adequacy and internal assessment process; 3) Market discipline through public disclosure of 
various financial and risk indicators.  
Existing research has already produced some evidence on the impact of the credit risk 
management systems and particularly benefits and drawbacks of the Internal Ratings Based 
approaches (IRB); e.g. see Hakenes and Schnabel (2011), Heid (2007), Ruthenberg and 
Landskroner, (2008). In this paper we are interested to understand how Bank Holding 
Companies (BHC) adopt the risk measurement practices for their operational risk exposures 
and why some of them choose to invest in more sophisticated approaches. Several studies 
have already highlighted the importance of the operational risk management and the impact of 
operational losses on BHC market value (Cummins, Lewis, & Wei, 2006; Gillet, Hübner, & 
Plunus, 2010). Generally, capital markets punish BHC much more severely than operational 
losses themselves.  
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Formally, the operational risk is defined in Basel II New Capital Accord as:  
“…the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events…” (BCBS, 2004, p. 149) 
, and it is a subject of a compulsory capital charge. Three compliance methods to 
determine the capital charge are proposed: the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), the 
Standardized Approach (SA), and the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA). While the 
first two approaches define operational risk capital charge as a fraction of bank earnings, 
AMA requires banks to develop their own risk-sensitive models to determine the amount of 
needed capital to cover banks against the operational risk exposures within a time horizon of 
one year. Together with qualitative requirements banks that opt for this free-way approach 
should base their models on historical data of operational losses (internal, and, if necessary, 
external). Among possible methodologies, the Value-at-Risk techniques (VaR) have become 
the most popular. These advanced models are supposed to reflect better bank operational risk 
profile and should lead to considerable improvements in risk identification and management.  
This right to choose gained a considerable interest among practitioners and scholars and 
raised many questions. The purpose of this study is to examine which factors lead BHC to 
invest in risk-sensitive operational risk measurement models (AMA) and to test empirically 
whether this approach allows banks to save capital as it is showed by BHC internal 
assessments (economic capital).  
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop our 
research propositions. Section 3 introduces our data, variables and descriptive statistics. In 
section 4, we present our empirical models and discuss the correlation among variables. 
Section 5 describes our empirical results. In section 6 we discuss our findings and conclude. 
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2. Literature review and research propositions 
Today, the increase of BHC size is the result of geographical expansion and the entry in 
new business areas. The growing part of non-interest banking activities increases substantially 
bank operational risks (Edwards et al., 1995). To control these new risks, banks might need to 
implement sophisticated risk management systems and also are more likely to have necessary 
resources for that. Research in financial accounting shows, that large-size firms are more 
likely to implement costly accounting standards (Dumontier & Raffournier, 1998; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993). Moreover, numerous studies in enterprise risk management (ERM) field 
suggest that the investment in ERM systems increases with the size of a firm (Beasley, Clune, 
& Hermanson, 2005; Colquitt, Hoyt, & Lee, 1999). Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) suggest that 
the adoption of internal ratings approaches (IRB) for credit risk requires substantial 
investments in risk measurement technologies. As IRB, AMA requires the use of advanced 
risk quantification tools and extensive expertise, thus the same “cost argument” should be 
relevant for operational risk. VanHoose (2007) estimated that an average cost of compliance 
with risk-sensitive approaches under Basel II is around $70 million. Only relatively large 
banks can afford such investment for risk measurement systems. Moreover, we suppose that 
other factors than size might influence the bank choice to adopt risk-sensitive risk 
measurement approaches for operational risks.  
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2.1. Prior knowledge  
The prior experience in risk-sensitive measures of operational risk exposures might 
positively influence a BHC choice to adopt AMA. The theoretical ground of this proposition 
refers to the notion of a firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & 
George, 2002). Until the introduction of Basel II, there were no particular requirements for 
the operational risk assessment. Banks had been managing this type of risk in their own ways. 
Thus, by the time they had to choose one of three proposed approaches, banks had 
accumulated different experiences in this area of risk management. Hida II (2005) suggests 
that despite of intentions of risk managers to adopt AMA for BHC operational risk 
measurement only few banks are ready to implement it. AMA requires a comprehensive risk 
management framework with subjective assessments, key indicators, data collection, and 
controlling processes. By the end of 2007, some financial institutions had already adopted 
risk-sensitive measurement techniques, especially for an estimation of the economic capital 
(sometimes also called as risk-bearing capacity) associated with operational risks. Thus, 
banks that have been using internal models might dispose the necessary knowledge and 
resources to adopt the most sophisticated approaches under Basel II. Despite the argument 
that bank managers might be induced to adopt less sophisticated risk measurement approaches 
to avoid the information sharing with regulators and shareholders (Danielsson, Jorgensen, & 
de Vries, 2002), we propose the following hypothesis: 
H.1: Banks that had experienced risk-sensitive practices in operational risk assessment prior 
to Basel II introduction are more likely to adopt AMA. 
 
 
  
31
2.2. Level of equity 
The bank level of equity might influence the choice of banks to adopt AMA for 
operational risks for the following reasons. First, regulatory bodies and rating agencies argue 
that risk-sensitive approaches for operational risks should lead to the lower capital 
requirements (BCBS, 2001a; Ramadurai, Beck, Olson, & Spring, 2004). Our preliminary 
analysis of BHC internal assessment of capital for operational risks revealed that banks need 
less capital than it is required by regulators. Despite the fact that the levels of economic and 
regulatory capitals depend on different factors (Elizalde & Repullo, 2007), the risk-sensitive 
approaches under Basel II necessitate the implementation of similar techniques that banks use 
for the economic capital determination. Thus, banks that determine the economic capital 
might validate their methodologies for AMA capital determination and, as a consequence, 
profit from lower levels of capital. Furthermore, after the recent financial crisis, BIS issued 
new capital rules commonly known as Basel III (BCBS, 2010a) that require banks to increase 
substantially their prudential indicators and consequently their equity. These new constraints 
might stringent the AMA quantitative argument.  
Our second argument refers to the political considerations. As a bank leverage 
increases, depositors and other debtholders might have bigger concerns about bank risk-taking 
strategies and risk controls. The advanced approaches under Basel II are supposed to be more 
risk-sensitive and reveal better a particular bank operational risk exposures. These 
quantitative and political arguments drove us to the next hypothesis: 
H.2: Banks with lower levels of equity are more likely to adopt AMA. 
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2.3. Institutional factors 
While studying the reasons of management control systems’ adoption for product 
development, Davila et al. (2009) suggest that the reason for adoption is often unrelated to a 
particular role that these systems are supposed to play. Among several adoption factors, they 
highlight the importance of contracts with external parties and the legitimization symbols. We 
believe that these two elements play a major role in the process of adoption of a particular 
approach for operational risk quantification in banks. When pay-offs of AMA adoption are 
uncertain banks might search in the first place legitimacy benefits that this approach could 
bring. Moreover, the propensity of a particular financial institution to invest in AMA might be 
directly related to the ‘value’ that domestic regulatory bodies attribute to this sophisticated 
approach for operational risk assessment. Existing literature on organizational innovations 
shows that isomorphic pressures influence considerably firms’ decisions (Haveman, 1993).  
Institutional isomorphism can be a result of coercive, mimetic, and normative processes 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism occurs when powerful authority imposes 
firms to adopt certain practices; mimetic isomorphism results from responses to uncertainty 
by adopting practices used by successful organizations; and normative isomorphism is 
associated with the adoption of practices that are considered as appropriate in the firm 
environment. 
In terms of operational risk measurement practices, the institutional context might play 
a distinct role. First, the introduction of Basel II capital requirements for operational risks is 
itself an institutional pressure that intends to standardize BHC management practices and 
control systems. Together with the introduction of mandatory standards for operational risk 
capital charge calculation, BCBS leaves to banks a limited right to choose among three 
approaches. Therefore, the main question is: what approach is the best? One could naturally 
argue that approaches that cost more are better than those that cost less. However, this way of 
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thinking for the selection of management systems and practices is certainly questionable. 
Recommendations to adopt more sophisticated risk measurement approaches are often 
founded on myths and hypothetical evidence supported by agents that have a direct interest. 
Organizational sociology theories stress that myths might institutionalize the organizational 
behavior (Fennell, 1982; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Origins of such myths could come from 
organizational practices as well from opinions and judgments of agents perceived as 
important players in the field. In case of high uncertainty about technologies, organizational 
goals and external factors these myths become more believable.  
BCBS, like many of national regulators, support the adoption of risk-sensitive 
approaches. The primary argument for this posture is that these approaches will help banks to 
manage better operational risks and a capital buffer will adequately cover bank against the 
operational risk exposures. Wahlström (2006) drawing on the interviews of Swedish banks’ 
senior managers, showed that these managers blindly believe in the success of Basel II rules 
for operational risks despite of their personal disaccord with these rules. The major argument 
explaining this behavior of Swedish managers is following: 
 
“…The accord was so strongly supported by the managers in the banks…as a result of 
the process in which common agreements become socially produced. The Basel Committees’ 
communication in the accord and its supporting documents is highly persuasive…” (p.512). 
 
Having considered all these arguments, we propose that, in countries with stricter 
regulatory standards and more sophisticated business environment BHC will more likely 
invest in AMA. 
 
H.3.a: BHC in countries with more stringent regulatory policies will more likely adopt AMA. 
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H.3.b: BHC in countries with more sophisticated business environment will more likely adopt 
AMA. 
 
2.4. Listing status 
In many countries, stock exchange rules require listed banks to improve their corporate 
governance and risk management reporting. Listed banks, by complying with stock exchange 
regulation, might have a higher propensity to adopt the most sophisticated risk measurement 
approaches for regulatory issues. Paape and Speklé (2012) report that listed firms have more 
formalized and developed Enterprise Risk Management systems compared to non-listed 
organizations. Kleffner et al. (2003) suggest that one of the main reasons to adopt ERM 
practices in Canadian firms is the compliance with Toronto Stock Exchange guidelines. 
Moreover, Gillet et al. (2010) report that in case of considerable operational losses, the 
decline of a market value is significantly higher than the operational loss amount announced. 
These market value losses are proportionally larger for BHC with a higher franchise value, 
implying that operational losses punish more severely banks with stronger profit-generation 
perspectives (Cummins et al 2006). Thus, listed banks might have a greater need to 
implement risk-sensitive approaches to manage better risk exposures and avoid the 
destruction of their market capitalisation.  
Having considered these arguments we formulate a following hypothesis: 
 
H.4: Listed BHCs are more likely to adopt AMA. 
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2.5. Quantitative considerations 
In this section we intend to discuss the issues concerning the quantitative side of AMA 
adoption. While the regulators and rating agencies insist on the argument that banks will 
benefit from lower capital requirements if they adopt AMA, we could not identify any 
previous studies confirming this hypothesis. BCBS argues that the increasing sophistication in 
operational risk measurement will progressively lead to a lower need of capital and a better 
risk management (BCBS, 2001a). Rating agencies also insist that AMA gives a lower capital 
than those determined under less sophisticated approaches (Ramadurai et al., 2004). Dangl 
and Lehar (2004) comparing the capital requirements under Basel I capital accord and those 
computed under internal VaR-based approaches of well-capitalized banks, suggest that these 
banks might increase leverage or reduce equity without treating their solvency. Nevertheless, 
this study is based on the theoretical modelling and does not analyse any data. On the other 
hand, there are opposing arguments to the hypothesis that the sophistication in operational 
risk measurement will necessarily lead to lower capital requirements. Despite the fact that SA 
is positioned by BCBS as more advanced than BIA, Sundmacher (2007) illustrates that the 
operational risks capital charge determined under SA might be higher than that determined 
under BIA. Moreover, if bank has experienced significant operational losses in recent years 
(e.g. Société Générale Group and UBS Group) the capital charge under AMA might be higher 
than that computed under less sophisticated approaches especially in contraction periods 
when banks might have relatively low positive earnings. 
These arguments lead us to the following research question: 
R.Q: Does the determination of the operational risk capital charge under AMA save BHC 
capital? 
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3. Variables, data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Variables measurement 
We measured the sophistication of BHC operational risk measurement approach by a 
dummy variable, Approach, which takes 1 if bank has adopted the Advanced Measurement 
Approach to determine its operational risk capital charge and 0 if it opted for earnings-based 
approaches (SA or BIA). The variable ORWA measures the bank operational risk-weighted 
assets. To eliminate the size effect we scaled it by BHC total assets. We approximated the 
bank experience in operational risk management by the categorical variable called ORmgmt. It 
is the score of two dummy variables. First variable, ORmgmt_EC, takes 1 if BHC was 
committed in the economic capital determination for operational risks in the year previous to 
Basel II introduction. Second, ORS_SU is equal 1 if BHC had already established central and 
independent unit for the operational risk management before Basel II introduction. For most 
of BHC in our sample, we took the information for these variables from 2007 risk 
management reports. Higher values indicate a higher BHC operational risk management 
experience. To measure size, several options exist: total assets, total revenue, number of 
employees and others. As the operational risk is primarily related to people and operations 
that they execute, we measured the BHC size as a total number of employees (Size). BHC 
level of equity, Equity, was measured as a ratio of common shareholders equity to total assets. 
The variable Complex approximates the BHC level of operational complexity and is measured 
as the ratio of BHC total assets to the number of employees. We measured bank performance 
with the pre-tax profit to total assets (Performance). BHC growth we measured as a 
difference in BHC total assets reported in 2007 and 2002 (Asset_growth). Listing is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the shares of BHC are listed on a public stock exchange.  
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To approximate the regulatory pressures we opted for the variable Stingent. This 
variable is an index constructed by Barth et al (2001; 2008) based on survey information. It 
measures the capital oversight stringency of national regulators, and is estimated with the 
following questions: a) whether national regulation has explicit requirements regarding the 
amount of capital that BHC must have relative to various guidelines (Basel rules, BHC 
inherent risks, unrealized losses); b) whether the source of funds counted as regulatory capital 
can include assets other than cash or government securities as well as whether the sources are 
verified by the national supervisors.  
The normative pressures on BHC risk management practices adoption process is 
measured with the variable BusSophis. This variable is an index based on the executive 
opinion survey conducted by Browne et al (2009). It measures the sophistication of national 
business environments taking into account the following components: a) local supplier 
quality; b) state of cluster development; c) nature of competitive advantage; d) nature of value 
breadth; e) control of internal distribution; f) production process sophistication; g) extent of 
marketing; h) willingness to delegate authority. Table 1 presents all variables and their 
definitions. 
Table 1 
 
Variables definitions 
Approach Dummy variable that takes 1 if BHC adopted the Advanced Measurement 
Approach for its operational risk-weighted assets determination. 
ORWA Operational risk-weighted assets scaled by total assets as reported by BHC in 
annual risk reports. Time series observations for the period from 2008 to 2009. 
ORWA_08/09/av Operational risk-weighted assets scaled by total assets as reported by BHC in 
annual risk reports for corresponding years (2008, 2009). Subscript “av” 
denotes an average of 2008 and 2009 observations. 
 
ORWA_AMA 
 
Operational risk-weighted assets scaled by total assets of BHC having adopted 
the Advanced Measurement Approach. 
ORWA_not_AMA Operational risk-weighted assets scaled by total assets of BHC having adopted 
either the Basic Indicators Approach or the Standardized Approach. 
  
38
ORmgmt Score of two dummy variables. First dichotomy variable is taking 1if BHC 
reports that it determines an economic capital for operational risks in 2007. 
Second variable is equal to 1 if BHC reported that it had already established in 
2007 a central unit for operational risk management. Higher value of this 
variable indicates a higher operational risk management experience. 
Size_07/08/09_av Natural logarithm of BHC total employees computed for corresponding years 
(2007, 2008, and 2009). Subscript “av” denotes an average of 2008 and 2009 
observations. 
Equity Ratio of BHC common equity on total assets. Time series observations for the 
period from 2008 to 2009. 
Equity_07/08/09/av Ratio of BHC common equity on total assets for corresponding years (2007, 
2008, 2009). Subscript “av” denotes an average of 2008 and 2009 
observations. 
Complex Ratio of total assets to total employees. Time series observations for the period 
from 2008 to 2009. 
Complex_08/09/av Ratio of total assets to total employees computed for corresponding year 
(2008, 2009). Subscript “av” denotes an average of 2008 and 2009 
observations.  
Performance Ratio of BHC pre-tax profit on total assets. Time series observations for the 
period from 2008 to 2009. 
Performance_07/08/09/av Ratio of BHC pre-tax profit on total assets computed for corresponding years 
(2007, 2008, and 2009). Subscript “av” denotes an average of 2008 and 2009 
observations. 
Asset_ghowth BHC assets growth for the period from 2002 to 2007. 
Listing Dummy variable indicating if BHC shares are listed on public stock exchange. 
Stringent Index measuring the stringency of national regulatory oversight of BHC 
capital. This index is based on the following questions: a) Whether national 
regulation has explicit requirements regarding the amount of capital that BHC 
must have relative to various guidelines (Basel rules, BHC inherent risks, 
Unrealized losses); b) Whether the source of funds counted as regulatory 
capital can include assets other than cash or government securities as well as 
whether the sources are verified by the national supervisors (Source: Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine, 2001, 2008). This index is ranged between 0 and 5. 
Higher values of this index signify more stringent bank capital oversight 
policies.  
BusSophis Index measuring the sophistication of national business environments that is 
the average score of the following components: a) Local supplier quality; b) 
State of cluster development; c) Nature of competitive advantage; d) Nature of 
value breadth; e) Control of internal distribution; f) Production process 
sophistication; g) Extent of marketing; h) Willingness to delegate authority 
(Browne et al, 2008). This index is ranged between 1 and 7. Higher values of 
this index signify more sophisticated bank business environment.  
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3.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
Knowing that Basel II Capital Accord is designed primarily for the large, 
internationally-active BHC, we built our sample using the Banker Top 1000 database. This 
database contains data on about 1000 world’s largest commercial banks ranked according to 
their Tier 1 capital as defined by the Basel II Capital Accord. Banks from 90 countries are 
represented in this database. According to Pasiouras et al. (2009) near 120 countries adopted 
the Basel II capital accord. However, we intentionally restricted our sample to BHCs from the 
54 countries members of BIS1, assuming that regulators from these countries will more likely 
fully adopt the Basel II Capital Accord guidelines. This selection criterion reduced our sample 
to 835 potential observations. Moreover, we observed that by 2008 in some countries Basel II 
capital requirements had not been implemented. In such countries banks were not required to 
compute operational risk capital charge. Due to this lack of data we had to eliminate all banks 
from 18 countries among which USA, China and Russia. In some other countries, despite the 
adoption of the Basel II accord, the quality of risk management disclosures is still not 
appropriate for our analysis. For banks from these countries we were not able to determine 
which risk measurement approaches were adopted by BHCs. Mainly, it concerns banks 
headquartered in Eastern Europe. After these filtering operations, our final sub-sample to test 
our research hypotheses consists of 160 BHC from 23 countries where the Basel II accord 
was enforced from 2008. 31 banks declared that they received the approval from their 
domestic regulators to determine capital charge under AMA.  
The second sample, is designed to answer our research question, and contains the data 
on 72 BHC that disclose their operational risk-weighted assets in 2008 and 2009 years. In 
total, we were able to collect 128 bank-year observations for this period for BHCs from 11 
countries. In addition to financial data provided by the Banker Top 1000 database, the 
                                                 
1
 Information about nations BIS-members can be found on the site: www.bis.org 
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information on operational risk measurement approach was collected manually from the 
2008-2009 risk reports. The data on business environment and capital stringency come from 
The Global Competitiveness Report (Browne et al., 2009) and the country regulations 
database constructed by Barth et al. (2001; 2008) respectively.  
Panels A and B of Table 2 provide descriptive statistics for our variables. Skewness-
Kurtosis normality test showed that all our variables, except Size are not normally distributed. 
Near 20% of banks in our sample adopted AMA. AMA banks are more likely to disclose their 
operational risk-weighted assets in risk management reports. Panel B.1 shows that the 
proportion of AMA-observations (0.291) is significantly higher than the proportion of AMA-
banks reported in Panel A (0.194). On average, ORmgmt amounts for 1.056 while operational 
risk-weighted assets equal to 4% of BHC reported assets (ORWA). Average capital ratio in 
2007 is at the level of 5.4% while it decreased to 4.5% in 2008-2009. Partially it could be 
explained by a growth of BHC average assets from 2007 to 2008-2009 and a decreased 
performance. Pre-tax return on BHC assets is almost 4 times higher in 2007 than in 2008. 
Near 70% of BHCs in our samples are listed on public stock exchanges. The country-level 
variables, Stringent and BusSophis exhibit similar characteristics in both samples.  
Table 2 
 
Descriptive statistics and Skewness-Kurtosis test 
         
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of variables used in logistic regressions AMA adoption analysis. Data for 2007 
reporting year except country-level variables.  
 
Nb of 
obs. Mean S.d. Min Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Skewness - 
Kurtosis test Prob < 
chi2 
BHC level         
Approach 160 0.194 0.396 0.000 1.000 1.550 3.402 n.a. 
Performance_07 160 0.011 0.018 -0.010 0.224 10.303 122.007 0.000*** 
Size_07 160 9.020 1.703 3.466 12.654 -0.221 2.736 0.424 
ORmgmt 160 1.056 0.856 0.000 2.000 -0.108 1.382 n.a. 
Equity_07 160 0.054 0.030 0.014 0.328 4.859 42.898 0.000*** 
Listing 160 0.700 0.460 0.000 1.000 -0.873 1.762 n.a. 
Country level         
Stringent 23 3.313 1.397 1.000 8.000 0.916 5.972 n.a. 
BusSophis 23 5.181 0.520 4.000 5.900 -0.393 2.514 n.a. 
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Panel B.1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in operational risk-weighted assets ordinary least squares analysis. 
Time series data for the period from 2008 to 2009 except country-level variables. 
 
Nb of 
obs. Mean S.d. Min Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Skewness - 
Kurtosis test Prob < 
chi2 
BHC level         
ORWA 126 0.040 0.026 0.005 0.249 3.956 29.363 0.000*** 
Approach 126 0.291 0.456 0.000 1.000 0.921 1.848 n.a. 
Complex 126 38.938 165.051 3.277 1936.821 9.774 108.683 0.000*** 
Performance 126 0.003 0.014 -0.151 0.022 -7.866 84.430 0.000*** 
Equity 126 0.045 0.019 0.005 0.127 0.891 4.893 0.001*** 
Listing 126 0.733 0.444 0.000 1.000 -1.055 2.114 n.a. 
         
Country level         
Stringent 11 3.182 1.411 1.000 8.000 0.955 6.084 n.a. 
BusSophis 11 5.188 0.493 4.000 5.800 -0.538 2.661 n.a. 
  
 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Panel B.2: Descriptive statistics of variables used in operational risk-weighted assets two-stage least squares 
analysis. 
  
Nb of 
obs. Mean S.d. Min Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Skewness - 
Kurtosis 
test Prob < 
chi2 
Asset_growth 159 1.511 1.159 -0.3 6.188 1.542 6.028 0.000*** 
ORWA_08 56 0.037 0.022 0.005 0.128 1.528 7.263 0.000*** 
ORWA_09 70 0.038 0.022 0.005 0.165 2.691 16.65 0.000*** 
ORWA_av 72 0.037 0.021 0.005 0.147 2.059 11.818 0.000*** 
Size_08 56 9.655 1.681 5.485 12.654 -0.44 2.516 0.275 
Size_09 70 9.525 1.866 3.664 12.618 -0.538 2.937 0.146 
Size_av 72 9.567 2.748 1.832 12.636 -0.475 2.077 0.016** 
Complex_08 56 32.639 87.059 4.393 585.386 5.393 32.508 0.000*** 
Complex_09 70 59.656 240.328 4.071 1936.82 7.101 55.01 0.000*** 
Complex_av 72 41.693 131.753 2.917 968.41 5.85 38.549 0.000*** 
Performance_08 56 0.004 0.008 -0.017 0.022 -0.442 3.243 0.241 
Performance_09 70 0.002 0.02 -0.151 0.015 -6.869 53.822 0.000*** 
Performance_av 72 0.003 0.011 -0.076 0.019 -4.729 34.161 0.000*** 
Equity_08 56 0.044 0.022 0.005 0.127 1.163 5.258 0.000*** 
Equity_09 70 0.046 0.016 0.019 0.091 0.403 2.924 0.324 
Equity_av 72 0.045 0.014 0.02 0.083 0.689 3.234 0.075* 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Panel A and B of Table 3 provide descriptive statistics of BHC classified by countries. 
The largest BHCs are headquartered in Belgium, France, and UK while the smallest come 
from Cyprus and Denmark. The most sophisticated banks in terms of operational risk 
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management experience are located in Germany, Australia, Canada, and Netherlands (Panel 
A, ORmgmt = 1.867, 1.625, 1.625, and 1.600) while BHCs from Finland, Austria, Italy, 
Denmark and Greece are the outsiders according to this criterion (Panel A, ORmgmt = 0, 
0.375, 0.563, and 0.667). According to Barth et al. (2008), the most stringent capital 
regulation is in Denmark (Panel A, Stringent = 8) while the most relaxing is in Ireland, 
Germany, and Singapore (Panel A, Stringent = 1). Business environment is the most 
sophisticated in Japan, Germany, and Switzerland (Panel A, BusSophis = 5.9 and 5.8) in 
contrast to Greece and Portugal (Panel A, BusSophis = 4 and 4.3). Finally, we would like to 
mention that banks from South Africa in 2007 demonstrated an outstanding performance in 
terms of pre-tax return (Performance_07) of 6.1%. The sample average is 1.1%. More 
information could be found in table 3.  
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Table 3 
 
Average figures grouped per country 
 
Panel A: Variables used in logistic regressions AMA adoption analysis. Data for 2007 reporting year except 
country-level variables. 
  
Country Nb of BHC Approach 
Performan
ce_07 Size_07 ORmgmt 
Equity   
_07  Stringent 
BusSo
phis Listing 
           
1 Australia 8 0.625 0.014 9.650 1.625 0.051 3.000 4.800 1.000 
2 Austria 8 0.000 0.006 8.336 0.375 0.052 5.000 5.500 0.250 
3 Belgium 2 0.000 0.009 10.751 1.500 0.028 4.000 5.300 1.000 
4 Canada 8 0.125 0.010 9.887 1.625 0.048 4.000 5.100 1.000 
5 Cyprus 3 0.000 0.011 7.217 1.000 0.061 3.000 4.700 1.000 
6 Denmark 6 0.000 0.011 7.673 0.667 0.059 8.000 5.500 0.500 
7 Finland 2 0.000 0.012 8.180 0.000 0.063 4.000 5.400 1.000 
8 France 7 0.429 0.006 10.826 1.429 0.050 2.000 5.300 0.429 
9 Germany 15 0.400 0.002 9.025 1.867 0.027 1.000 5.800 0.533 
10 Greece 9 0.000 0.011 8.452 0.667 0.063 3.000 4.000 0.778 
11 Ireland 3 0.333 0.012 9.063 1.000 0.059 1.000 5.000 0.667 
12 Italy 16 0.188 0.013 8.910 0.563 0.056 4.000 4.900 0.750 
13 Japan 14 0.071 0.004 8.643 1.000 0.055 4.000 5.900 0.929 
14 
Korea 
(South) 11 0.182 0.013 8.789 0.727 0.057 3.000 4.900 0.545 
15 Malaysia 4 0.000 0.012 8.380 0.750 0.071 3.000 4.800 0.500 
16 Netherlands 5 0.400 0.005 7.862 1.600 0.043 3.000 5.500 0.200 
17 Portugal 4 0.000 0.010 9.497 1.250 0.045 3.000 4.300 0.500 
18 Singapore 3 0.000 0.015 9.800 1.333 0.069 1.000 5.200 0.667 
19 
South 
Africa 5 0.000 0.061 9.563 1.200 0.113 4.000 4.600 0.800 
20 Spain 6 0.333 0.014 9.840 1.167 0.051 4.000 4.700 0.833 
21 Sweden 5 0.200 0.007 9.051 1.000 0.036 3.000 5.700 0.800 
22 Switzerland 8 0.250 0.012 8.099 0.500 0.059 3.000 5.800 1.000 
23 UK 8 0.250 0.012 10.360 1.250 0.059 3.000 5.200 0.625 
 Total 160 0.194 0.011 9.020 1.056 0.054 3.313 5.181 0.700 
  
 
                     
Panel B: Variables used in operational risk-weighted assets analysis. Time series data for the period from 2008 
to 2009 except country-level variables.  
  
Country Nb of 
obs. ORWA Approach Complex 
Performan
ce 
Equity Stringent BusSophis Listing 
                      
1 Australia 8 0.036 1.000 11.175 0.010 0.045 1.000 3.000 4.800 
2 Canada 15 0.047 0.133 7.588 0.007 0.049 1.000 4.000 5.100 
3 France 5 0.033 1.000 14.320 0.002 0.032 0.800 2.000 5.300 
4 Germany 23 0.017 0.478 70.246 -0.004 0.028 0.478 1.000 5.800 
5 Ireland 4 0.039 0.250 27.690 -0.040 0.056 0.750 1.000 5.000 
6 Italy 18 0.049 0.333 8.978 0.005 0.051 0.778 4.000 4.900 
7 Netherlands 8 0.020 0.333 352.719 0.001 0.023 0.222 3.000 5.500 
8 Spain 9 0.048 0.300 11.242 0.009 0.054 0.900 4.000 4.700 
9 Sweden 10 0.021 0.200 25.851 0.004 0.044 0.800 3.000 5.700 
10 Switzerland 10 0.052 0.300 16.983 0.007 0.057 1.000 3.000 5.800 
11 UK 16 0.050 0.250 10.910 0.006 0.052 0.625 3.000 5.200 
 Total 126 0.040 0.291 38.938 0.003 0.045 0.733 3.182 5.188 
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4. Models and correlation matrix 
4.1. Empirical models 
To test our research hypotheses we built the following logistic model: 
P [Y = AMA| X] = β0 + β1*ORmgmti + β2*Equityi + β3*Stringenti  + β4*BusSophisi + β5*Listingi + 
β6*Performancei + β7* Sizei + ∑ Countryi + ei                                     (Model 1) 
, P [Y = AMA| X] is the probability that BHC adopts AMA, and Φ is the CDF of the 
standard normal distribution. To answer our research question, R.Q., regarding the impact of 
operational risk approach on risk-weighted assets, we opted for the following OLS model: 
ORWA = β0 + β1*Approachit + β2*Complexit + β3*Performanceit + β4*Equityit + β5*Listingit + 
β6*Stringenti + β7*BusSophisi + ∑ Countryi + ∑ Yeart + eit                                                         (Model 2) 
To avoid the potential bias arising from the correlation between BHC choice to adopt 
AMA (Approach) and the error term when we use reported values to predict operational risk-
weighted assets, we apply a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model. It allows us to study the 
impact of the sophistication of risk measurement models on capital charge incorporating the 
effects of bank size and growth on the choice to adopt such approach. In the first stage, the 
BHC choice to adopt AMA is defined as a function of bank size and size-growth 
characteristics and of other unit and country specific variables. 
P [Y = AMA| X] = β0 + β1*Asset_growthit + β2*Sizeit + β3*Complexit + β4*Performanceit + β5*Equityit 
+ β6*Listingit + β7*Stringenti + β8*BusSophisi + ∑ Countryi + eit            (Model 3 -1S) 
In the second stage, we use the predicted values of BHC choice (Approach_predicted) 
by the first stage as a variable of main interest together with other control variables.  
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ORWA = β0 + β1*Approach_predictedit + β2*Complexit + β3*Performanceit + β4*Equityit + β5*Listingit 
+ β6*Stringenti + β7*BusSophisi + ∑ Countryi + eit                                                                   (Model 3 -2S) 
Subscripts denote individual BHC (i = 1, 2…, 160), and time period (t = 2008, 2009).  
 
4.2. Correlation among variables 
Table 4 presents the correlation coefficients of our variables. Variables in both samples 
exhibit quasi-identical correlation coefficients. From these tables, we can observe some 
multicollinearity among variables. Particularly, Size is negatively and significantly correlated 
with Equity (Panel A, -0.325). This confirms findings of Rime (2001) that large BHCs are less 
capitalized. Large banks are also more likely to be listed on public stock exchange (Panel A, 
0.322) and have a higher experience in voluntary operational risk-sensitive management 
(Panel A, 0.5). Publicly listed BHC are also more likely to invest in operational risk 
management systems, i.e. the correlation coefficient between Listing and ORmgmt is positive 
and significant (Panel A, 0.219). Banks with lower leverage exhibited a higher return on 
assets in 2007, i.e. correlation coefficient between Equity and Performance is 0.784 (Panel A) 
while in 2008-2009 the correlation between these variables remain positive, but is much less 
significant and is at the level of 0.139 (Panel B). Concerning country-level variables 
(Stringent and BusSophis), it is interesting to note that Stringent is negatively correlated with 
ORmgmt (Panel A, - 0.288). In the same time, the correlation coefficients between Stringent 
and Equity (Panel A, 0.162; Panel B, 0.067) are not significant. Among other results it is 
worth to note a high correlation between BHC capital ratios and BHC assets per employee 
(Panel B, 0.701). Other correlation coefficients could be observed in table 4. 
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Table 4 
 
Correlation among variables 
Panel A: Correlation matrix of variables used in logistic regressions AMA adoption analysis. Data for 2007 
reporting year except country-level variables. The significance levels are indicated below correlation 
coefficients. 
  
Approach Performance_07 Size_07 ORmgmt Equity_07 Stringent BusSophis 
  
  
 
    
Performance_07 -0.067  
 
    
  0.399  
 
    
Size_07 0.397 -0.036 
 
    
  0.000 0.649      
ORmgmt 0.487 -0.124 0.500     
  0.000 0.119 0.000     
Equity_07 -0.278 0.784 -0.325 -0.360    
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Stringent -0.224 0.097 -0.158 -0.288 0.162   
  0.005 0.223 0.046 0.000 0.041   
BusSophis 0.082 -0.241 -0.070 0.097 -0.220 -0.034  
  0.300 0.002 0.377 0.222 0.005 0.669  
Listing 0.148 0.101 0.322 0.219 -0.064 0.029 -0.043 
  0.061 0.202 0.000 0.005 0.424 0.712 0.590 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B.1: Correlation matrix of variables used in operational risk-weighted assets analysis. Time series 
data for the period from 2008 to 2009 except country-level variables. The significance levels are indicated 
below correlation coefficients. 
  
ORWA Approach Complex Performance Equity Listing Stringent 
                
Approach -0.205       
 0.008       
Complex -0.217 -0.066      
 0.005 0.397      
Performance 0.202 -0.006 -0.069     
 0.009 0.936 0.378     
Equity 0.005 -0.091 0.701 0.139    
 0.951 0.246 0.000 0.076    
Listing 0.001 0.115 -0.200 0.196 -0.124   
 0.992 0.143 0.010 0.012 0.112   
Stringent 0.309 -0.254 -0.096 0.218 0.067 0.136  
 0.000 0.001 0.223 0.005 0.391 0.081  
BusSophis -0.278 0.121 0.149 -0.175 0.199 -0.159 -0.221 
 0.000 0.122 0.056 0.025 0.010 0.041 0.004 
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5. Empirical results 
5.1. Adoption of risk-sensitive approaches for operational risk measurement 
The first set of regressions tests our hypotheses related to factors leading to the 
adoption of AMA for the operational risk-weighted assets determination (Table 5). As we 
already mentioned, in all models we control for country fixed effects. The coefficients of a 
variable Size are significant at 1% level in all five models. These results support previous 
findings suggesting that the propensity to adopt a sophisticated risk management system 
increases with the size of a bank. The investments for AMA implementation are important, 
thus only banks with a certain size seem to be able to afford such a sophisticated system. No 
significance was found for bank performance in 2007.  
The coefficients of the variable measuring the BHC prior experience in the operational 
risk management, ORmgmt, are significant at 1% and positive (Models 5-1 and 5-5). This is 
consistent with our first hypothesis stating that BHC with more formalized operational risk 
management structure and experience in risk-sensitive measurements are more likely to turn 
their attention to AMA.  
Moreover, we found an empirical support for our second hypothesis. Coefficients of 
Equity_07 are significant at 1% level and negative. The level of bank equity does influence 
the decision of banks to invest in AMA.   
The stringency of national regulatory oversight, Stringent, seems to influence positively 
the propensity of banks to adopt AMA. Nevertheless, the coefficients are not significant at 
usual levels (Models 5-3 and 5-5). Thus, we cannot conclude that stronger pressures on BHC 
capital from national regulators encourage banks to adopt the most sophisticated measurement 
system for operational risks. Similar results were found for bank business environment. The 
coefficients of the variable BusSophis in models 5-3 and 5-5 are not significant, but are 
  
48
positive as we predicted. More demanding environment in terms of supplier quality, cluster 
development, competitive advantage, and production process seems to have no influence on 
the sophistication of BHC risk management.  
Our results do not support the hypothesis concerning the listing status of a bank. 
Coefficients of variable, Listing, in models 5-4 and 5-5 are not even close to be significant. 
This might imply that stock exchange rules have no distinct effect on BHC choice to adopt 
risk measurement approach.  
Table 5 
 
Factors that influence BHC choice to adopt the Advanced Measurement Approach for operational 
risks 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions AMA adoption analysis. Sample consists of 114 bank 
holding companies from 11 countries. In models 1-4 we test each of our 4 hypotheses separately. In model 
5 we include all variables of interest and control variables. In each model we control for BHC performance 
and BHC size as well as for country fixed effects. 
        
    Probit models 
    
Expected 
sign Model 5-1 Model 5-2 Model 5-3 Model 5-4 Model 5-5 
 Control variables       
        
 Performance_07  -23.541 46.108 -18.513 -20.942 50.379 
   (49.039) (44.356) (35.598) (37.747) (51.410) 
 Size_07  0.410*** 0.451*** 0.570*** 0.544*** 0.288** 
   (0.136) (0.119) (0.112) (0.119) (0.141) 
 Variables of interest       
        
H.1 ORmgmt + 1.448***    1.432*** 
   (0.323)    (0.366) 
H.2 Equity_07 -  -48.791***   -49.701*** 
    (14.901)   (16.328) 
H.3.a Stringent +   2.130  2.292 
     (1.449)  (1.420) 
H.3.b BusSophis +   2.377*  1.964 
     (1.295)  (1.202) 
H.4 Listing +    0.400 -0.231 
      (0.478) (0.532) 
 Country FE  yes yes yes yes yes 
 Constant  -7.123*** -4.263** -25.581** -6.897*** -21.319** 
   (1.587) (1.674) (11.717) -1.473 (10.662) 
        
 Wald chi2  48.133 46.341 46.523 48.197 58.011 
 Pseudo R-squared  0.456 0.371 0.303 0.308 0.516 
  Observations   114 114 114 114 114 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.2. Operational risk capital charge univariate analysis 
Table 6 presents the results of the univariate analysis. In this analysis, we compare 
operational risk-weighted assets (ORWA) determined under AMA to those computed under 
less sophisticated approaches (SA or BIA). On average, the operational risk-weighted assets 
computed under AMA (ORWA_AMA) represent 3.2% of BHC total assets, while operational 
risk-weighted assets determined under other approaches (ORWA_non_AMA) amounts for 
4.1% (Model 6-1). The difference of 0.9% of BHC total assets is significant at 5% level. In 
models 6-2 and 6-3 we compare the operational risk-weighted assets reported by banks in 
2008 and in 2009 correspondingly. The results do not differ significantly from the previous 
analysis. Only in 2008, the difference between ORWA of AMA banks and non_AMA banks is 
slightly lower but still significant at 10% and represents 0.8 % of BHC average assets. As we 
suspect that figures reported by banks in 2008 could be seriously impacted by the recent 
financial crisis, we performed an additional test where we compare the average ORWA of 
2008 and 2009 observations for both types of BHC. This test showed a difference in ORWA 
between AMA banks and non_AMA banks of 0.7% of total assets confirming our previous 
results. These findings confirm that AMA adoption leads to lower capital requirements. By 
adopting AMA for the operational risk-weighted assets assessment, banks might save capital 
and create a competitive advantage compared to BHC, non-AMA adopters.  
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Table 6 
Comparison of operational risk-weighted assets determined under different approaches 
This table presents results of the univariate test of the operational risk-weighted assets determined under different 
approaches proposed by Basel II. In model 6-1 we compare the average operational risk-weighted assets computed 
under AMA to those determined under two other approaches (BIA and SA) for the time series period from 2008 to 
2009. In models 6-2 and 6-3 we decompose our sample on two sub-samples according to the reporting year. In model 
6-4 we compare the average figures of the operational risk-weighted assets reported in 2008 and 2009. 
 
T-test: diff. = mean (ORWA_AMA ) - mean (ORWA_not_AMA) 
   
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. 95% Conf. Interval t-Stat. 
         
 
ORWA_AMA 47 0.032 0.002 0.014 0.028 0.036 Model   
6-1 
Time series 
2008 - 2009 ORWA_non_AMA 79 0.041 0.003 0.025 0.035 0.046 t = -2.253** 
 
 
       
 
ORWA_AMA 20 0.032 0.004 0.016 0.024 0.039 Model   
6-2 2008 ORWA_non_AMA 36 0.040 0.004 0.025 0.032 0.049 t = -1.455* 
 
 
       
 
ORWA_AMA 27 0.032 0.003 0.013 0.027 0.037 Model   
6-3 2009 ORWA_non_AMA 43 0.041 0.004 0.026 0.033 0.049 
t = -1.71** 
 
 
       
 
ORWA_AMA 27 0.032 0.003 0.014 0.026 0.037 Model   
6-4 
Average     
2008 - 2009 ORWA_non_AMA 45 0.039 0.004 0.024 0.032 0.047 
t = -1.517* 
                  
  
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.3. Operational risk capital charge multivariate analysis 
To check the robustness of our univariate results, we performed multivariate analysis 
which results are reported in table 7. In all six models we controlled for business complexity 
(Complex), accounting performance (Performance), bank level of equity (Equity), listing 
status (Listing), regulatory pressures (Stringent) and normative pressures (BusSophis). Models 
7-1, 7-2, and 7-3 report OLS regression results where our variable of interest is dichotomous 
and takes the observed values (Approach). Overall, this OLS analysis confirmed our 
univariate findings. The coefficients of Approach are negative and significant at usual levels. 
In addition, to limit a potential problem of the correlation of our variable of interest Approach 
with the error term, we performed the two-stage least squares analysis  
Table 7 
Multivariate analysis of operational risk-weighted assets 
This table reports the results of multivariate analysis of the operational risk-weighted assets scaled by total assets. Models 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3 present the OLS 
regressions results while models 7-4, 7-5, and 7-6 report the results of 2SLS analysis. In model 7-1 we use the time series data for the period from 2008 to 2009. In 
models 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 7-5, and 7-6 the sample is reduced only to observations corresponding to focal year.  
  
OLS 2SLS 
 
2008 - 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 Average 2008-2009 
        First-stage Second-stage First-stage Second-stage First-stage Second-stage 
 Model 7-1 Model 7-2 Model 7-.3 Model 7-4 Model 7-.5 Model 7-6 
Approach -0.007*** -0.004 -0.007*        
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)        
Approach_predicted      -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
      (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Instruments           
Asset_growth    -0.242  0.169  -0.048  
    (0.246)  (0.174)  (0.174)  
Size (08/09/av)    0.691***  0.442***  0.164**  
    (0.256)  (0.139)  (0.079)  
Control variables           
Complex (08/09/av) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001** -0.003 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Performance (08/09/av) 0.102 0.627 0.052 -54.961 0.612 33.838 0.223 -18.347 0.441 
 (0.118) (0.470) (0.112) (36.329) (0.584) (35.691) (0.194) (22.507) (0.321) 
Equity (08/09/av) 0.255*** 0.358** 0.199** 7.064 0.005 -12.981** 0.115 -1.720 0.048 
 (0.080) (0.167) (0.089) (7.322) (0.021) (5.830) (0.131) (5.153) (0.078) 
Listing -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.810 -0.009 0.779 0.003 0.992* -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.810) (0.008) (0.720) (0.006) (0.557) (0.006) 
Stringent -0.001 0.001 -0.001 2.029 0.009*** -8.336** -0.001 0.556 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (1.486) (0.003) (4.004) (0.004) (2.427) (0.005) 
BusSophis -0.014* -0.012 -0.013 2.496* 0.003 -7.056* 0.001 0.484 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (1.506) (0.009) (3.652) (0.009) (2.214) (0.010) 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Constant 0.102** 0.074 0.097** -26.341** 0.016** 60.921* 0.029 -6.780 0.036 
 (0.039) (0.060) (0.047) (13.25) (0.007) (33.001) (0.052) (20.091) (0.056) 
Observations 126 56 70 56 56 70 70 72 72 
Wald chi2    24.731  26.649  19.881  
Pseudo R-squared    0.299  0.329  0.204  
R-squared 0.533 0.685 0.471   0.644   0.503   0.541 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(González, 2005; Laeven et al., 2009; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010). As instrumental variables, 
we selected BHC size (Size) and BHC asset growth (Asset-growth). The results are reported in 
table 7, models 7-4, 7-5, and 7-6. The predicted values of AMA (AMA_predicted) exhibit 
negative signs, but they are not significant at usual levels.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion  
The evolution of banking industry has made this sector much more risky. As the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 showed, the problems that are primary related to an excessive 
risk-taking behavior by banks might spill over the banking sector and affect considerably the 
world economic stability. To prevent the “moral hazard” situation faced by bank owners and 
managers, the regulators introduced new minimum requirements for credit, market and 
operational risk with the objective of having banks gaining control of their risk factors and 
improve the governance of the entire industry. One of such regulatory instruments is the Basel 
II New Capital Accord structured on three pillars. According to Pillar 1, banks should have 
enough capital to absorb their credit, market, and operational risk exposures. However, the 
intention of the international regulator is to offer several approaches to banks and let them 
decide which one to adopt. Therefore, banks must decide whether to invest in risk-sensitive 
risk management practices or to satisfy to elementary compliance standards by implementing 
relatively inexpensive, standard measurement methods. Little is known about why some 
financial institutions prefer to implement the most sophisticated methods for their risk 
management. Today, when the financial crisis impacted the behavior of almost all large banks 
across the world, supplementary discretionary expenses had to be weighted several times 
against potential benefits. Risk-sensitive measurement approaches proposed by Basel II are 
costly (Hakenes et al., 2011; VanHoose, 2007). In contrast, the standardized approaches are 
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not expensive and their introduction allows banks to make immediate savings. But, whether 
these savings are worth potential benefits and what kind of benefits can be derived remains 
unclear. 
Despite of an increased interest of the academic community to this issue, there is 
limited evidence on banks’ choice of risk assessment approaches. The aim of this paper is to 
identify factors that influence BHC decision to adopt in sophisticated risk measurement 
systems. We limited our interest to operational risks and particularly to the adoption of the 
risk-sensitive approach (AMA) for the capital charge determination. We chose the operational 
risk for two reasons. First, this is a new requirement that banks did not face before. Second, 
there is a common opinion that this risk is highly idiosyncratic to institutions and 
measurement policies cannot be standardized. 
Our main findings show that the adoption of AMA is motivated by potential technical 
and managerial advantages in the operational risk management and the level of equity that 
banks had in years previous to Basel II adoption.  
 We also predicted that certain institutional factors might influence the banks’ decision 
to adopt AMA. As regulators and rating agencies favor the adoption of risk-sensitive 
approaches like AMA we predicted that the degree of regulatory pressure might influence 
positively the propensity of banks to invest in AMA, even if pure economic outputs of such 
approach remain highly uncertain. Moreover, we predicted that BHC institutional 
environment might influence the decision to adopt the sophisticated risk management 
practices. Higher business standards in a particular country might lead to a higher 
sophistication in bank risk management practices. Nevertheless, our empirical findings did 
not robustly confirm these hypotheses. Moreover, our empirical results suggest that the listing 
status does not influence the bank decision to adopt AMA.   
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The second question we raised in this study is whether AMA leads to lower capital 
requirements as it is suggested by different agents (BCBS, 2001a; Ramadurai et al., 2004). 
Banks that adopt AMA can save capital and gain a competitive advantage compared to those 
that adopt income-based approaches. The empirical results of our analysis generally support 
this view, but are not robust enough.  
Our research is a subject of several limitations. First, due to the information availability, 
our sample is restricted. Some banks do not disclose information on operational risk 
management as it is requested by Pillar III of Basel II. However, we are confident that our 
findings could be generalized to all large, internationally-active banks. Second, our measures 
of regulatory and normative pressures could be debatable. These two variables are constructed 
only on the country-level. We might expect that even in a formally homogenous regulatory 
environment, different banks might be subject to different pressures, especially if this 
concerns regulatory pressures. Banks that positioned as “to big to fall” could be encouraged 
by national regulators to invest in their risk management practices. Third, we recognize that 
endogeneity issues might arise in our analysis. Specifically, the sophistication in the 
operational risk management might be a cause of a bank intention to adopt risk-sensitive 
approaches proposed by Basel II. With 2SLS analysis we tried to solve partially this problem, 
but further analysis is needed, especially concerning the choice of instrumental variables. 
At this stage, additional research is needed to explore if the adoption of sophisticated 
risk-sensitive approaches brings any financial, managerial and technical benefits to financial 
institutions. It is also interesting to understand the real cost of the operational risk assessment 
under different measurement techniques and how these measurement practices impact the 
bank overall risk management process and, more importantly, risk-taking strategies. This will 
facilitate the evolution of the regulatory framework and hopefully reduce the probability of 
systemic crises in the banking sector.  
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Essay 2: 
Internal Risk Controls and their Impact on Bank Solvency 
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1. Introduction 
In the past decade, the importance of a healthy banking system for the development and 
stability of the world economy has been outlined in many academic and practitioner studies 
(Caprio, Laeven, & Levine, 2007; Kimball, 2000) and accompanied with calls for more 
research on the role that control systems can play to prevent financial crises (Hopwood, 
2009). The recent financial crisis spilled over the financial sector and heavily impacted the 
real economy stressing the dependence on this sector. It also raised a large number of 
questions such as: Why did financial institutions with sophisticated risk systems suffer from 
the financial crisis (leading to the bankruptcy of several of them) and record massive losses 
during 2007 – 2009? What organizational, managerial and regulatory measures can be taken 
to prevent such situations?  
These questions are of great interest to improve the risk management of financial 
institutions and scholars have started to examine the effectiveness of internal and external 
governance and risk management systems to control risk taking in banks and, by that, to 
lower the risk of systemic financial crisis. Kimball (2000) suggests that banks could minimize 
errors in risk management as well as potential exposures of these errors by building the strong 
and formalized risk management mechanisms sensitive to bank business strategies. Scholes 
(2000) stresses that actual risk quantitative modeling is not efficient to prevent financial crisis 
and to some extent could provoke it. Greater quality of risk management and measurement 
models reduce bank losses and banks might respond to this by proposing new, riskier 
products that, in their turn, require better internal risk controls. 
Nocco and Stulz (2006) say that the role of risk management in organizations changed 
dramatically during the past decade. Today, the risk management function plays an important 
role in a day-to-day management by providing bank managers the crucial information about 
potential risk and returns of different business strategies they might implement to carry out 
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the overall strategic plan set by firm shareholders. In bank holding companies, enterprise risk 
management has another important role to balance the overall risk of default among different 
group legal entities (Gatzert et al., 2008). However, despite the importance of the topic, few 
studies examine the impact of risk management systems (RMS) on bank performance and 
risk. With a sample of 74 US Bank Holding Companies (BHC), Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) 
investigate the link between risk controls and bank risk. Through the construction of a Risk 
Management Index (RMI), they find that BHCs with a high RMI have lower enterprise-wide 
risk. Aebi et al (2011) performing an empirical analysis with a sample of North American 
banks provide mixed evidence about BHC risk management governance mechanisms and 
bank performance. While the reporting status of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) exhibits a 
positive and empirically significant relation with bank performance, the presence of a 
dedicated risk committee on the bank board and the executive status of the CRO do not seem 
to influence bank stock and equity returns.  
Our paper extends these studies on various aspects. First, our measure of risk control 
intensity combines three types of risk control mechanisms: the existence of a risk committee 
(RC) composed of board members, the appointment of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) in the 
management executive board, and the use of risk-sensitive measurement models (Value-at-
Risk modeling) to assess risk exposure. Second, we measure bank solvency using two internal 
risk measures, Tier 1 ratio and Z-score, and not stock market prices. Our two dependent 
variables aim to capture BHC risk taking and risk exposure associated to internal factors and 
not factors from the outside environment. Third we examine the relationship between risk 
controls and BHC solvency through the prism of various interaction factors that might 
influence this relationship. Fourth, our sample is made of international banks excluding US 
banks. With a sample of 465 Bank Holding Companies (BHC)-Year observations collected 
over the period of 2004 - 2010, we analyze under which circumstances internal risk controls 
62 
influences banks’ solvency. We find a positive effect of internal risk controls on BHC 
solvency, which is positively moderated by ownership concentration and the comparative 
power of national bank regulators. However, we find that the relationship between risk 
control and solvency is negatively affected (hence internal risk control become less efficient) 
when banks follow a growth strategy. Overall, the study is one of the first of its kind 
contributing to an enhanced understanding of the effectiveness of internal risk controls in the 
banking sector. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous 
literature on the various aspects of bank risk taking and performance. Section 3 discusses our 
data and our methodology. In section 4, we provide descriptive statistics of the sample. 
Section 5 and 6 present results and discuss their robustness. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Previous studies examined determinants of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and its 
impact on firm performance (Barton, Shenker, & Walker, 2002; Lam, 2003). With a sample 
of US insurers, Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) find a positive relation between the use of ERM 
and firm value. Beasley et al. (2005) document that the stage of ERM implementation is 
positively associated to the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO), board independence, CEO 
and CFO apparent support for ERM, the presence of a Big Four auditor, entity size in the 
banking, education, and insurance industries. Another stream of research is aimed to study 
different types of ERM (Mikes, 2009) and the roles of CRO in managing and communicating 
firm risks (Mikes, 2008).  
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2.1. Risk controls and BHC solvency 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983) internal risk controls are corporate governance 
mechanisms designed to reduce information asymmetry and align interests between investors 
and managers. Stulz (2008) stresses, that in banks, the primary role of internal risk controls is 
to identify and to evaluate the risks faced by the firm, to communicate these risks to 
management (and possibly to the board of directors), and to monitor and manage those risks 
in a way that ensures the firm bears only the risks its management and shareholders want 
exposure to. The determination of company’s risk taking is an important duty of the bank 
board of directors as the main representative of its shareholders. Incurring a large loss might 
not just be a problem of poor risk management, but also a cause of unsuccessful business 
strategies and unfavorable external factors. However, risk control and risk management 
failures indisputably might affect firm performance. In the banking sector, the recent large 
losses of Société Générale in 2008 and UBS in 2011 are well-known examples. Stulz (2008) 
identified five potential risk management failures: 1) use of inappropriate risk metrics; 2) 
erroneous measurement of known risk; 3) ignoring of certain risks; 4) incorrect 
communication of identified risks to business managers; 5) inappropriate monitoring and 
managing of day-to-day risks. Frequently, these failures occur as consequences of political 
games driven by different bank stakeholders such as manager-regulator games, owner-
manager games and others. Nevertheless, risk control systems create value by enabling senior 
management to quantify and manage the risk-return tradeoff faced by firms. In the financial 
sector, effective risk controls should ensure bank solvency by reducing risk of default. The 
aim of risk controls is also to ensure that all material risks are “owned”, and risk-return 
relation carefully evaluated (Nocco et al., 2006). Considering these arguments, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: The intensive use of risk controls is positively associated with bank solvency. 
 
2.2. The interaction of risk controls with structure, strategy and regulatory factors 
In the management accounting field studies have analyzed effects of interactions 
between management control systems and context factors on performance (Chenhall, 2003). 
With regard to governance systems, Aguilera et al. (2008) recently call for extending agency 
theoretical work on the link between corporate governance systems and performance by 
studying how these relations depend not only on context factors but also on 
complementarities, i.e. other management practices in place. This conceptual approach has 
become increasingly popular in studies on bank risk taking (Laeven et al., 2009; Shehzad, de 
Haan, & Scholtens, 2010). Gordon et al (2009) found that the relation between ERM and firm 
performance is contingent on environment stability, intensity of industry competition, firm 
size, complexity of firm assets, and board of directors’ strength. These theoretical arguments 
as well as the empirical results indicate that efficiency of risk management systems in banks 
might also be dependent on contextual variables. Therefore, we argue in this paper that the 
relation between internal risk controls and bank solvency depends on a) ownership structure, 
b) growth strategy, and c) banking sector regulation issues. 
 
Ownership structure 
Traditional agency theory suggests that diversified owners have incentives to take 
higher risks in business strategies, while a higher proportion of personal wealth invested in a 
firm equity decreases the motivation to take excessive risk (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Moreover, owners with large shareholdings have greater possibilities to control business 
strategies, and consequently the BHC risk control system should be more intensively used and 
more aligned with their interests. Supporting this idea, Caprio et al., (2007) find that 
ownership concentration represents a moderating factor for the relation between the 
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shareholder protection laws and bank valuations. The ownership structure of firms hence 
plays an important role to reduce agency costs and align managers-shareholders interest. With 
a sample of property-liability insurance companies, Cole et al. (2011) find that each 
ownership structure has an influence on bank risk-taking. Denis et al. (1999) suggest that 
ownership structure affects the magnitude of agency problems and, as a consequence, 
influences corporate strategy, organizational structure and management systems. However, 
the existing research on the ownership structure in banks demonstrates mixed results. Laeven 
and Levine (2009) report that bank risk-taking strategies are positively associated to the 
comparative power of shareholders, while the studies of Iannotta et al. (2007) and Shehzad et 
al. (2010) find that the ownership concentration lowers bank risk of default by increasing the 
quality of assets and capital adequacy ratios. Demsetz et al. (1997) suggest that the relation 
between the bank shareholding structure and its risk-taking is contingent on the charter value 
of a bank. Only in low-capitalized banks a higher ownership concentration leads to a higher 
risk-taking, while in banks with relatively high franchise value this relationship is not 
empirically significant. These findings imply that ownership concentration matters for bank 
risk-taking. 
Taking into consideration the fact that major shareholders have greater possibilities to 
control the behavior of bank managers, we propose that ownership concentration will 
moderate positively the effectiveness of risk management control systems.  
 
Hypothesis 2a:  Increase in ownership concentration will strengthen the relationship between 
internal risk controls and BHC solvency.  
 
BHC growth strategy 
The question how internal control systems and business strategies interact was raised in 
many academic studies (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Denis et al., 1999; Peek, Rosengren, 
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& Kasirye, 1999; Spira & Page, 2003). Kober et al. (2007) find the existence of a two-way 
relationship between management control systems and strategy. The simultaneous influence 
of enterprise risk management systems and firm business strategy is also underlined by 
Gordon et al. 2009 that consider strategy as a critical element to manage risk. Previous 
research in strategic management field suggests that firm growth strategies lead to a lower 
efficiency in day-to-day operations, and negatively affect financial performance, while 
downsizing strategies improve efficiency (Hopkins & Hopkins, 1997; Morris, Cascio, & 
Young, 1999). 
As a result, internal risk controls in banks pursuing growth strategies are likely to lose 
their effectiveness at assessing and monitoring risks. Hence, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Growth strategies will make weaker the relationship between internal risk 
controls and BHC solvency.  
 
Banking regulation 
The introduction of new banking reforms and the financial crises have boosted research 
on banking regulation rules (Caprio et al., 2007; González, 2005; Pasiouras et al., 2009). 
Preliminary findings suggest that identical rules for all banks operating within one particular 
country are not efficient and might have adverse effect. While stringent capital requirements 
are associated with fewer non-performing loans, Barth et al. (2004) stress that capital 
stringency is not robustly linked with the banking sector stability and bank performance. 
Moreover, González (2005) report that under certain conditions, regulatory restrictions might 
even increase bank risk-taking incentives. Pasiouras et al. (2009) in their turn, report 
controversial results: stricter capital requirements have positive effect on cost efficiency but 
decrease bank profitability, while restrictions on bank activities impact bank cost and profit 
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exactly in the opposite way. Several studies consider banking regulations as important context 
factors impacting the relation between ownership structure and bank performance and risk 
(Laeven et al., 2009; Shehzad et al., 2010). Danielsson et al. (2002) infer that the presence of 
external regulation may induce banks to decrease the quality of its risk management system.  
Based on this theoretical argumentation and empirical findings, we predict that higher 
external requirements might reinforce the effectiveness of internal risk controls. To comply 
with rules imposed by strong regulatory bodies, BHC managers will implement and use more 
intensive internal risk control mechanisms leading to a positive impact on risk taking and 
solvency. For example, if regulators force banks to adopt advanced approaches under Basel II 
Capital Accord (BCBS, 2004a) banks should considerably improve their qualitative side of 
risk management. As a result, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2c: More stringent regulatory environment will strengthen the relationship 
between internal risk controls and BHC solvency.  
 
3.    Data, variables and methodology 
3.1. Sample and data 
To test our hypotheses we use a sample of 465 Bank Holding Companies (BHC)-Year 
observations covering the period from 2004 to 2010. We built it using BHC annual risk and 
corporate governance reports, as well as The Banker and Worldscope databases. We first 
chose Bank Holding Companies from country-members of Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision2. Then, we excluded countries in which, Basel II New Capital Accord had not 
been enforced before 2008 to avoid discrepancies in BHC risk-taking measurement. For the 
                                                 
2
 The Committee's members come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Source: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm 
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remaining countries, we extracted data on BHC from The Banker Database Top 1000 
Rankings. To balance our sample and avoid an overweighting from banks of countries such as 
Italy and Japan, we decided to limit our sample to a maximum of 10 publicly listed BHC per 
country and taking the largest ones (Caprio et al., 2007; Laeven et al., 2009). When a country 
had only one BHC, we decided not to include it in the sample. For each BHC-Year 
observation we manually collected data on the risk management systems and structure, risk 
measurement approaches, and ownership structure from the annual reports. Information on 
bank solvency and risk of default were obtained from the Banker database while financial 
data was collected from the Worldscope database. Data for our country-level control variables 
came from the Financial Development Report 2010 Executive Opinion Survey (Bilodeau, 
2010) and Barth et al. (2001; 2008). As a result, our final sample consists of 88 banks and 465 
BHC-year observations from 16 countries. Because of data availability for country-level 
variables, Corgov and Bsstab, we use 446 bank-year observations in models where the 
dependent variable is Tier 1 Ratio and 287 bank-year observations in models where the 
dependent variable is Z-score. 
 
3.2. The dependent variable - measuring bank solvency and risk of default 
Existing literature identify different proxies for bank riskiness. For example, the 
fraction of non-performing or impaired loans is often used as a measure of bank riskiness 
(Podpiera, 2004; Shehzad et al., 2010) and/or an indicator of asset quality (Ciháck et al., 
2010). However, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2010) suggest that in different countries 
the accounting reporting rules vary to a large extent making it difficult to compare non-
performing loans (NPL) in cross-country study. In addition, this indicator is mainly associated 
with bank credit risk and does not take into account other important factors such as market 
risk, operational risk, and the level of a bank’s capital. For example, NPL is not an 
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appropriate indicator of BHC riskiness whose strategies are oriented more towards other 
businesses than traditional lending.  
Measures based on capital market valuations such as stock return volatility are also 
commonly used to reflect bank riskiness (Anderson & Fraser, 2000; Demsetz et al., 1997; 
Ellul et al., 2010). Nevertheless, from a risk point of view, these measures tend to reflect too 
much the financial market conditions and not the specific risk associated to a bank.  
Finally, the measures used by regulatory bodies to assess capital adequacy like Tier 1, 
Tier 2, Tier 3, and Overall Capital ratios are the third type of proxies to reflect bank riskiness 
(Rime, 2001; Shehzad et al., 2010; Stolz & Wedow, 2011). These proxies proposed by the 
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and common to the associated countries combine 
BHC risk taking with the safeguard measures, i.e. a level of capital to absorb potential losses.  
Based on these arguments, we decided to use Tier 1 ratio as a measure of bank 
solvency. To control that our results are not influenced by the proxy selection, we selected 
also Z-score as an alternative measure (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2010; Iannotta et al., 2007; 
Laeven et al., 2009). Z-score is often called as “a distance to insolvency” (Boyd et al., 1998; 
Roy, 1952). It is defined as the average return on assets plus equity/assets divided by the 
standard deviation of the return on assets over the period [t-7 to t]. To overcome the problem 
of a high skewness of Z-score, we use its natural logarithm as applied by Laeven and Levine 
(2009).  
 
3.3. Measuring the intensity of internal risk control use 
Bank board of directors takes an ultimate responsibility for the whole process of risk 
management (Dickinson, 2001). The Chief Risk Officer (CRO), as the head of this function, 
must report directly to the board of directors, even though in most BHC, he is formally 
accountable to the CEO. Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) studying a sample of industrial firms 
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found that it is rather the intention of firm debt holders to appoint CRO with the purpose to 
reduce the information asymmetry about firm risks. In banks, where the equity part seldom 
accounts for 5% of total assets this argument might present a greater interest.  
According to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010a), banks should have a) 
a risk management function including a chief risk officer, a compliance function and an 
internal audit function, each with sufficient authority, stature, independence, resources and 
access to the board; b) risks should be identified, assessed and monitored on an ongoing firm-
wide and individual entity basis; c) an effective internal controls system which should be in 
place; d) the sophistication of a bank’s risk management, compliance and internal control 
infrastructures should keep pace with any changes to its risk profile (including its growth) and 
to the external risk landscape; and e) effective risk management requires frank and timely 
internal communication within the bank about risk, both across the organization and through 
reporting to the board and senior management. 
Two fundamental elements of the bank corporate governance play a special role in the 
risk management process. First, the board of directors, often represented by a risk committee, 
should set the overall bank risk strategy and policies. Second, to implement risk management 
principles set by the board, bank directors should delegate these responsibilities to a particular 
executive. This executive is commonly referred to as the Chief Risk Officer (CRO). 
To estimate the intensity of internal risk controls use, we first explored a short sample 
of bank risk management and corporate governance reports. This preliminary research 
revealed that the risk management function is typically exercised at the following levels of 
BHC: 1) shareholders level, represented by the board of directors, 2) senior management 
level, and 3) operational level, represented by risk management day-to-day functions 
exercised within different departments of a bank. If the first two mainly relate to risk 
71 
management governance, the third one reflects the importance of the risk management 
activities in the bank daily business.  
The example of Credit Suisse Group 2010 Risk Management Report presented in Table 
1 illustrates these different levels. 
 
“”…Our risk management organization reflects the specific nature of the 
various risks in order to ensure that risks are managed within limits set in a 
transparent and timely manner. At the level of the Board, this includes the following 
responsibilities: 
- Group/Bank Board: responsible to shareholders for the strategic 
direction, supervision and control of the Group and for defining our overall 
tolerance for risk; 
- Risk Committee: responsible for assisting the Board in fulfilling 
their oversight responsibilities by providing guidance regarding risk 
governance and the development of the risk profile and capital adequacy, 
including the regular review of major risk exposures and the approval of 
overall risk limits; 
Risk management function reports to the CRO, who is independent of the 
business and is a member of the Executive Board. 
We use an economic capital limit structure to manage overall risk taking. The 
overall risk limits for the Group are set by the Board and its Risk Committee and are 
binding. Any excess of these limits will result in immediate notification to the 
Chairman of the Board’s Risk Committee and the CEO of the Group, and written 
notification to the full Board at its next meeting. Following notification, the CRO can 
approve positions that exceed the Board limits by no more than an approved 
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percentage with any such approval being reported to the full Board…” (Credit Suisse 
Group 2010 Annual report, p. 120). 
Table 1 
 
Credit Suisse Group key risk management bodies and committees 
Group level 
Board of Directors / Risk Committee 
Executive Committee / Chief Risk Officer 
Capital Allocation & Risk Management Committee (CARMC) 
ALM / Capital / Funding / 
Liquidity Position Risks OpRisk / LCD / BCM 
Risk Processes & Standards 
Committee 
Credit Portfolio & 
Provisions Review 
Committee 
Reputational Risk & 
Sustainability Committee 
Division level 
Private Banking  Investment Banking  Asset Management 
Risk Management Committee 
Risk Management 
Committee Risk Management Committee 
Source: Credit Suisse Annual Report 2010, Risk management section, p. 120. 
 
 
The main problem we faced in the data collection on the use of internal risk controls is 
the multiplicity of definitions that BHCs use in their reports. On that matter, there is no 
common standard for risk management reporting. Nevertheless, we identified three internal 
risk controls that prevail within banks. Based on them, we constructed our internal risk 
control index (IRCI) reflecting the sum of three dummy variables – risk committee, chief risk 
officer and economic capital VaR model. Risk Committee variable takes the value of 1 if the 
BHC board of directors has appointed an independent risk management committee meeting at 
least once a year. BHCs use different names for such board committee, but prevailing names 
are: a) risk committee, b) risk and capital committee and c) credit and market risks committee. 
The Chief Risk Officer variable takes the value 1 if the BHC reports that the risk management 
function is headed by a Chief Risk Officer member of the executive board. The Economic 
Capital VaR Model variable takes the value of 1 if BHC reports the use of internal risk-
sensitive measurement models to calibrate its potential loss exposures. The output of such 
models is often called – economic capital. Elizalde and Repullo (2007) define economic 
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capital as follow: “the capital level that bank shareholders would choose in absence of capital 
regulation” (p.1). Some BHCs disclose in their reports the use of internal risk-sensitive 
models, but do not clearly disclose techniques they apply. In this case, we check if the BHC 
had adopted advanced risk-measurement approaches under Basel II New Capital Accord in 
2008 (or other year of a first reporting).  
 
3.4. Ownership concentration, business strategy, and national bank regulations 
A large variety of measures has been used for bank ownership structure. For example, 
Barth et al. (2001) classify banks as widely held if they do not have shareholders with 10% 
and more voting rights while Laeven and Levine (2009) use a cutoff of 20% of direct and 
indirect shareholdings to define a large shareholder. Following Shehzad et al. (2010) and 
Caprio et al. (2007), we measure ownership concentration with a dummy variable (Largeshd) 
that equals 1 if the BHC has at least one owner with direct shareholdings higher than 10% and 
0 otherwise.  
To estimate if the BHC pursues an aggressive business strategy, we use two variables 
expressing the growth in total assets and securities investments. Strart_1 is defined as the 
growth of BHC assets compared to previous year while Strat_2 is the growth of BHC 
securities investments including items such as: treasury securities, federal agency securities, 
state and municipal securities, trading account securities, securities purchased under resale 
agreements, mortgage backed securities, federal funds, other securities, and other 
investments.  
To test our hypothesis that bank regulations moderate the relationship between internal 
risk controls and bank solvency we use two measures proposed by Barth et al. (2001). The 
variable Cstring is an index of regulatory oversight of BHC capital. This index is based on 
following questions: 1) Is the minimum capital asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line 
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with Basel guidelines? 2) Does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? 3) Are 
market values of loan losses not realized in accounting books deducted from capital? 4) Are 
unrealized losses in securities portfolios deducted? 5) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses 
deducted? 6) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? 7) Are the 
sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory or supervisory authorities? 8) 
Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than 
cash or government securities? 9) Can the initial disbursement of capital be done with 
borrowed funds? The variable Restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on BHC activities. 
It concerns regulatory impediment to banks engaged in: 1) securities market activities, 2) 
insurance activities, 3) real estate activities, and 4) ownership of nonfinancial firms. 
 
3.5. Control variables 
In our study we use two sets of control variables. The first set includes variables 
controlling for different factors specific to the BHC characteristics and is made of Tobin’s Q 
(Tobin), equity to assets (Equity), revenue to assets (Revenue), loan to assets (Loan), deposits 
to assets (Deposit), the natural logarithm of assets (Size), and one dummy variable indicating 
if prudential ratios are reported under Basel II New Capital Accord (Basel).  
The second set of variables controls for country characteristics and consists of a 
variable for the corporate governance development (Corgov) and a variable for the national 
banking system stability (Bsstab) (The Financial Development Report, 2010). Corgov is an 
index measuring the efficiency of country corporate governance standards. It is based on the 
following items: 1) extent of incentive-based compensation, 2) efficacy of corporate boards, 
3) reliance on professional management, 4) willingness to delegate, 5) strength of auditing 
and reporting standards, 6) ethical behaviour of firms, and 7) protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests. Bsstab is an index measuring the national banking system stability. It 
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is based on the following items: 1) frequency of banking crises, 2) financial strength indicator, 
3) measures of real estate bubbles, 4) financial stress measures, 5) Tier 1 capital ratio, and 6) 
output loss during banking crisis. All variables are described in Table 2. 
 
3.6. Empirical models 
To test our hypotheses we built the following base model: 
Solvency = β0 + β1* IRCIit + β2*Largeshdit + β3*Strat_1it + β4*Strat_2 it + 
        β5*Cstringit + β6*Restrictit + ∑ βx*Xit + ∑ βy*Yit + eit 
where subscripts i denotes individual BHC (i = 1,2…, 334), t time period (t = 2004,…, 
2010) while X is a set of BHC-level control variables and Y is a set of variables controlling 
for country characteristics. To control for potential self-selection bias we apply Heckman 
two-step correction models. The first stage of these models is used to predict the likelihood 
that a BHC will disclose characteristics of its internal risk controls. We attributed 0 to BHC-
Year observations for which we were not able to collect information on IRCI and 1 for those 
for which the information was available. Independent variables for this first-stage estimation 
were chosen by applying stepwise procedure of selection only for variables that significantly 
impact this choice at usual levels: market-to-book value, equity to assets ratio (Equity), loans 
to assets ratio (Loan), deposit to assets ratio (Deposit), the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Size), the index of corporate governance (Corgov), and the index of banking system stability 
(Bsstab).  
 
 
 
 
76 
4.     Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the whole sample. On average Tier 1 ratio 
amounts to 10.3%, and 3.002 for the Z-score. Regarding this latter variable it means that 
profits would have to fall by 20 times their standard deviation to outstand BHC equity. The 
index of internal risk controls (IRCI) amounts on average to 1.6. In terms of ownership 
concentration, 58% of our BHC have a large shareholder with shareholdings greater than 
10%. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on banks classified by countries. Banks from 
Switzerland also exhibit an outstanding average of Tier 1 ratio (14.4%). It is important to note 
that for the whole sample and in each country the average Tier 1 ratio is higher than the level 
required by regulatory bodies. Banks from Germany, France, and Belgium have the lowest 
ratios of common equity to assets (Equity) with 2.7%, 3.1% and 3.5% respectively, but the 
level of IRCI is above the average of the sample. Z-score does not vary much across 
countries. Asian countries show the highest values with Singapore (3.698), Hong Kong 
(3.600), and Japan (3.360). The internal risk controls index (IRCI) of Saudi Arabia is one of 
the weakest (IRCI = 0.324) despite the highest average ratio Tier 1 (15.6%). However, it is 
worth noting the amount of equity buffer that Arabian banks hold (Equity = 12.3%). 
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Table 2 
  
Definitions of variables 
Tier 1 Ratio Tier 1 ratio as reported at the end of a reporting year 
Z-Score Natural logarithm of Z-score computed according to the formula (ROA+CAR)/ STDV (ROA) 
using data over 1998-2010. 7 years historical data used to compute Z-score for each BHC-Year 
observations. For example, to compute Z-score for one BHC observation in 2007 we use data on 
ROA over 2001-2007. 
Largeshd Dummy variable that takes 1 if there is at least one owner with shareholdings greater than 10% 
and 0 otherwise. 
Strat_1 BHC total assets growth comparing to previous year ((Assetst / Assetst-1) – 1). 
Strat_2 BHC investments growth comparing to previous year ((Investmentst / Investmentst-1) – 1). 
Investment includes: treasury securities, federal agency securities, state and municipal securities, 
trading account securities, securities purchased under resale agreements, mortgage backed 
securities, federal funds, other securities, and other investments. 
Tobin Tobin’s Q that equals to Market value of equity plus the Book value of liabilities divided by the 
Book value of assets. 
Equity BHC total common equity. 
Revenue BHC revenue (interest income plus non-interest income) divided by total assets. 
Loan Total loans divided by total assets. 
Deposit Total deposits divided by total assets. 
Size Natural logarithm of BHC total assets. 
Basel Dummy variable that takes 1 if Tier 1 Ratio is reported under Basel II New Capital Accord. 
Cstring Index of regulatory oversight of BHC capital. This index is based on following questions: 1) Is 
the minimum capital asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line with Basel guidelines? 2) Does 
the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk? 3) Are market values of loan losses not 
realized in accounting books deducted from capital? 4) Are unrealized losses in securities 
portfolios deducted? 5) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted? 6) What fraction of 
revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital? 7) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital 
verified by the regulatory or supervisory authorities? 8) Can the initial disbursement or 
subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? 9) 
Can the initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds?  
Restrict Index of regulatory restrictions on the activities. It concerns regulatory impediment to banks 
engaging in: 1) securities market activities, 2) insurance activities, 3) real estate activities, and 4) 
ownership of nonfinancial firms. 
Corgov Index measuring the efficiency of country corporate governance standards. It is formed from 
following measures: 1) extent of incentive-based compensation, 2) efficacy of corporate boards, 
3) reliance on professional management, 4) willingness to delegate, 5) strength of auditing and 
reporting standards, 6) ethical behaviour of firms, and 7) protection of minority shareholders’ 
interests. 
Bsstab Index measuring the national banking system stability. It is formed from the following measures: 
1) frequency of banking crises, 2) financial strength indicator, 3) measures of real estate bubbles, 
4) financial stress measures, 5) Tier 1 capital ratio, and 6) output loss during banking crisis. 
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Table 3 
       
Variables definitions 
 
 
Nb of obs. Mean S. D. Minimum Maximum Median 
Tier 1 ratio 465 0.103 0.038 0.039 0.340 0.094 
Z-score 299 3.002 0.711 -0.631 4.730 3.045 
IRCI 465 1.589 1.128 0.000 3.000 2.000 
Largeshd 465 0.583 0.494 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Strat_1 465 0.119 0.208 -0.336 1.954 0.083 
Strat_2 465 0.220 0.583 -0.994 9.003 0.145 
Cstring 446 4.265 1.379 1.000 6.000 4.000 
Restrict 446 2.058 0.619 1.250 3.250 2.000 
Tobin 465 1.292 0.205 0.926 2.685 1.274 
Equity 465 0.062 0.040 -0.043 0.411 0.055 
Revenue 465 0.060 0.039 0.020 0.420 0.050 
Loan 465 0.622 0.167 0.024 1.086 0.643 
Deposit 465 0.523 0.200 0.011 0.904 0.508 
Size 465 18.925 1.597 14.345 22.052 18.942 
Basel 465 0.344 0.476 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Corgov 465 5.084 0.654 3.600 6.100 5.300 
Bsstab 465 4.853 0.901 3.300 6.400 5.100 
 
From the internal risk controls point of view, BHCs from South Africa, Australia, and 
Canada are the most advanced with an index reaching a level of 2.714, 2.622 and 2.936 
respectively. The IRCI for European countries amounts to 1.713 and varies within a range of 
0.882 for Italy and 2.524 for France. The proportion of traditional lending activities (Loan) is 
more or less identical across countries. Only BHCs from France demonstrate relatively low 
proportion of loans to total assets (36.6%). Deposit financing is more popular in Hong Kong 
(Deposit = 80.7%) and Japan (Deposit = 75.5%) in contrast to European countries which 
mainly rely on long term borrowings to finance their business activities (average Deposit in 
European countries ≈ 38 % and average Equity ≈ 4.65 %).  
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Table 4 
 
Average figures grouped per country 
  
Tier 1 
Ratio 
Z-
score 
IRCI Strat_1 Strat_2 Tobin Equity Revenue Loan Deposit Size 
Australia 0.082 3.018 2.622 0.189 0.366 1.230 0.062 0.080 0.719 0.565 18.688 
Belgium 0.104 2.279 2.071 0.056 0.091 1.393 0.035 0.092 0.562 0.385 20.150 
Canada 0.107 2.936 2.265 0.102 0.177 1.146 0.045 0.055 0.561 0.693 18.956 
France 0.090 2.894 2.524 0.106 0.167 1.195 0.031 0.052 0.366 0.321 21.243 
Germany 0.096 1.472 1.962 0.065 0.168 1.492 0.027 0.049 0.526 0.278 19.275 
Hong Kong 0.099 3.600 0.263 0.116 0.156 1.079 0.082 0.043 0.680 0.807 17.151 
India 0.091 2.114 1.250 0.250 0.277 1.280 0.077 0.108 0.568 0.575 18.044 
Italy 0.074 3.351 0.882 0.120 0.199 1.379 0.073 0.062 0.690 0.407 18.686 
Japan 0.092 3.360 1.156 0.340 0.102 1.085 0.039 0.026 0.616 0.755 19.488 
Saudi Arabia 0.156 2.846 0.324 0.147 0.462 1.469 0.123 0.064 0.657 0.733 17.014 
Singapore 0.124 3.698 1.810 0.114 0.186 1.129 0.090 0.040 0.568 0.592 18.639 
South Africa 0.135 2.550 2.714 0.210 0.148 1.310 0.108 0.155 0.691 0.469 17.725 
Spain 0.081 2.935 1.903 0.108 0.283 1.460 0.054 0.060 0.730 0.416 19.222 
Sweden 0.084 2.690 1.880 0.088 0.135 1.455 0.042 0.043 0.699 0.321 19.557 
Switzerland 0.144 2.707 1.000 0.026 0.093 1.318 0.060 0.043 0.604 0.498 18.372 
United Kingdom 0.105 3.277 1.486 0.250 0.356 1.264 0.050 0.055 0.525 0.413 20.434 
Nb of Obs.  465 299 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 465 
 
Table 5 presents the pair-wise correlation matrix. Variables IRCI, Strat_1, Strat_2, 
Tobin, Equity, Revenue, Loan, Deposit, and Size are mean-centered. Correlation coefficients 
between our variables of interest (IRCI, Largeshd, Strat_1, Strat_2, Cstring, Restrict) do not 
present special risk of multicollinearity. 
 
5.  Regression results 
The first set of empirical analyses investigates the impact of internal risk controls on 
bank solvency and risk of default. We report the results of our regressions in Table 6. To 
ensure a rigorous evaluation, we conduct various tests. First, we test Hypothesis 1 with two 
dependent variables, our base variable Tier 1 ratio and Z-score as an alternative variable. We 
apply Heckman two-step model to adjust for potential problems of sample self-selection bias. 
We control for BHC and year fixed effects. All models are well-fitted with R-squared values 
ranging from 0.845 to 0.918. 
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In model 6-1 and 6-2 we regress Tier1 ratio against our company-level and country-
level independent variables. The coefficients of IRCI are significant at 1% level (β=0.00533, 
p<0.01). A one standard deviation change of IRCI is associated with a change in Tier 1 ratio 
of 0.7%. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and in line with findings of Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2010). Strong internal risk controls are effective in lowering risk in banking 
institutions. As reported in models 6-3 and 6-4, our results are similar when Z-score is used as 
the dependent variable for bank solvency and risk of default. The coefficients of IRCI are 
positive and significant (β=0.13311, p<0.05). 
Regarding the coefficients of our control variables, it is worth to note some interesting 
elements. Coefficients of Tobin are positive and significant in all models suggesting that high 
BHC franchise value has a positive impact of bank solvency and risk of default. This result is 
consistent with previous findings that bank franchise value is a significant force in mitigating 
risk taking (Keeley, 1990). The coefficients of Equity are positive and significant as expected 
since common equity is a large part of Tier 1 capital and is used directly in Z-score formula. 
The deposit financing of BHC (Deposit) has also the predicted sign and impacts positively on 
BHC solvency and risk of default. Higher percentage of deposit financing induces banks to 
practice low-risk activities and consequently the overall bank solvency is higher.  
Our second set of empirical analyses investigates the moderating effects of ownership 
concentration, growth strategies, and banking regulations on the relation between internal risk 
controls and BHC solvency and risk of default (Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c). We report our 
results in Table 7. We enter each interaction term separately to reduce multicollinearity. Like 
before, we include variables controlling for BHC and country characteristics and adjust for 
BHC and Year fixed effects. In models 7-6 to 7-10 we apply Heckman two-step sample 
selection bias correction. Our findings are in line with our hypotheses. In Model 7-1, the 
relation between IRCI and Tier 1 ratio is positively moderated by the ownership concentration 
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(β =0.00517, p<0.05). It confirms that the presence of a large shareholder strengthens the 
impact of internal risk controls on bank solvency and risk of default (Hypothesis 2a). The 
coefficients of the two interaction terms IRCI*Strat_1 and IRCI*Strat_2 in models 7-2 and 7-
3 are negative and statistically significant at 5% (β = -0.00007, p<0.05; β = -0.00253, p<0.05) 
and support the hypothesis that high growth strategies impact negatively the effectiveness of 
BHC internal risk controls (Hypothesis 2b). It reflects that changes in bank size and structure 
of assets bring new challenges to risk management systems. With Model 7-4, we examine the 
impact of supervisory oversight on the relation between internal risk controls and bank 
solvency. As predicted, the coefficient of Cstring has a positive and significant effect at 1% 
level (β =0.00315, p<0.01) suggesting that high levels of regulatory requirements for bank 
capital (in size and quality) strengthen the effectiveness of BHC internal risk controls 
(Hypothesis 2c). 
However, our second measure of regulatory requirements, Restrict, enters negatively in 
the relation between IRCI and BHC solvency (β =-0.00639, p<0.01), meaning that in highly 
restricted regulatory environments, the impact of internal risk controls on bank solvency and 
risk of default is lower. These results are unexpected and might reflect that in environments 
where banking activities are restricted and separated, the impact of voluntary internal risk 
controls is reduced to a large extent. In models 7-6 to 7-10, the results of our two-step 
Heckman regressions are consistent with results of OLS regressions. 
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Table 6 
 
BHC solvency and internal risk controls 
 
This table reports results of the multivariate analysis where the dependent variables measure bank solvency (Tier 1 
Ratio and Z-score). In OLS models, 6-1 and 6-3, we regress our dependent variables on the index measuring the 
strength of bank internal risk controls (IRCI). Models 6-2 and 6-4 report results of the two-step Heckman analysis.  
  OLS 
Heckman two-
step OLS 
Heckman two-
step 
(6-1) (6-2) (6-3) (6-4) 
  
Tier 1 Ratio Tier 1 Ratio Z-score Z-score 
IRCI (+) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.133** 0.152*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.062) (0.055) 
Largeshd -0.004 -0.005* -0.261** -0.203* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.127) (0.113) 
Strat_1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Strat_2 -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.139* 0.134* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.081) (0.071) 
Cstring 0.004* -0.004 -0.401** 0.503** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.184) (0.215) 
Restrict -0.001 0.016 0.213 0.475 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.489) (0.442) 
Tobin 0.067*** 0.067*** 1.904*** 1.720*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.583) (0.517) 
Equity 0.552*** 0.556*** 12.865*** 11.576*** 
 (0.063) (0.057) (2.583) (2.293) 
Revenue -0.048 -0.038 (3.791)* (4.851)** 
 (0.065) (0.059) (2.095) (2.159) 
Loan -0.079*** -0.075*** -1.008 -0.989* 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.624) (0.578) 
Deposit 0.053*** 0.060*** 2.960*** 2.928*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.758) (0.697) 
Size -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.158 -0.149 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.152) (0.136) 
Basel 0.004 0.002 -0.173 -0.251** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.133) (0.123) 
Corgov 0.014* -0.003 -0.671* 0.231 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.374) (0.235) 
Bsstab -0.015* 0.005 -0.533 -0.271 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.340) (0.353) 
BHC fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.121 0.094 9.472*** 1.299 
 (0.096) (0.059) (3.330) (2.404) 
Mills Lambda  0.002  -0.070 
  (0.003)  (0.098) 
Wald chi2  4486.961***  1388.960*** 
  0.000  0.000 
Observations 446 459 287 303 
R-squared 0.918   0.845   
Standard errors in parenthese; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6.      Robustness tests 
Additionally, we performed several robustness tests. To validate, the construction of 
our Internal Risk Controls Index (IRCI) made of three categorical variables - risk committee, 
chief risk officer (CRO), and use of economic capital VaR model - we split our IRCI into 
three parts and regressed Tier 1 ratio and Z-score on each of them. Our results remained 
significant for risk committee and economic capital VaR Model at 1% and 5% levels 
respectively. 
We also used some alternate measures to check the stability of our results. For the 
measurement of ownership concentration (Largeshd), we applied the thresholds of 20% and 
50% instead of 10% (Laeven et al., 2009; Shehzad et al., 2010). We also used an alternative 
measure and regress our dependent variables on the percentage owned by the largest BHC 
shareholder instead of the presence of a large shareholder. For our growth strategy measures, 
we replaced growth of assets by growth of revenue. In all these different cases, our results 
remained similar to our original results. 
Concerning our moderator variables we executed the following tests. We included in 
each corresponding model the quadratic terms of IRCI, Largeshd, Strat_1, Strat_2, Cstring, 
and Restrict to test for nonlinearity concerns. All these terms entered non-significantly and 
confirmed the robustness of our moderation effects.  
Finally, we replaced our dependent variable Tier 1 ratio by the Tier 1 capital buffer 
(Stolz et al., 2011) computed as a difference between actual BHC Tier 1 ratio and the 
minimum level required by national regulators. The significance and signs of our variables of 
interest in all models did not change. 
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Table 7 
 
BHC risk, ownership structure, bank strategies, regulation, and internal risk controls 
 
This table reports results of the multivariate analysis where the dependent variable measures bank solvency (Tier 1 Ratio). In OLS models, 7-1to 7-5, we 
regress our dependent variable on the index measuring the strength of bank internal risk controls (IRCI) intercepted with moderation and complimentary 
factors (Largeshd, Strat_1, Strat_2, Cstring, and Restrict). Models 7-6 to 7-10 report results of the two-step Heckman analysis.  
  
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Heckman two-step 
Heckman 
two-step 
Heckman 
two-step 
Heckman 
two-step 
Heckman two-
step 
  
7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 7-6 7-7 7-8 7-9 7-10 
  
Tier 1 
Ratio 
Tier 1 
Ratio 
Tier 1 
Ratio 
Tier 1 
Ratio 
Tier 1 
Ratio 
Tier 1 
Ratio 
Tier 1 
Ratio 
Tier 1 
Ratio 
Tier 1 
Ratio Tier 1 Ratio 
 
           
IRCI (+) 0.003 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.008* 0.018*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.009** 0.0184*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Largeshd -0.007** -0.004 -0.004 -0.007** -0.005 -0.008** -0.005* -0.005* -0.008*** -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Strat_1 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Strat_2 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cstring 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Restrict 0.006 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.009 0.023* 0.016 0.014 0.021 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Tobin 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Equity 0.555*** 0.553*** 0.549*** 0.566*** 0.574*** 0.559*** 0.558*** 0.555*** 0.567*** 0.574*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) 
Revenue -0.061 -0.032 -0.047 -0.064 -0.028 -0.049 -0.024 -0.036 -0.062 -0.019 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) 
Loan -0.078*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.071*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Deposit 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.061*** 0.052*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.069*** 0.058*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Size -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Basel 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Corgov 0.016* 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.014* 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Bsstab -0.016** -0.014* -0.014* -0.016** -0.013* 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
IRCI * Largeshd (+) 0.005**     0.004*     
 (0.003)     (0.002)     
IRCI * Strat_1 (-) 
 -0.001**      -0.001**    
 
 (0.000)      (0.000)    
IRCI * Strat_2 (-) 
  -0.003**      -0.002**   
 
  (0.001)      (0.001)   
IRCI * Cstring (+) 
   0.003***      0.003***  
 
   (0.001)      (0.001)  
IRCI * Restrict (+) 
    -0.006***      -0.007*** 
 
    (0.002)      (0.002) 
BHC FE yes yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes Yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.100 0.110 0.100 0.150 0.135 0.053 0.097* 0.098* 0.080 0.132** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095) (0.064) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Mills Lambda 
     0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 
     -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
Wald chi2 
     4521.88*** 4522.58*** 4526.19*** 4622.02*** 4633.93*** 
 
     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 446 446 446 446 446 459 459 459 459 459 
R-squared 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.921 0.920           
Standard errors in parenthese; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7.      Discussion and conclusion 
Previous research and actual problems in the financial sector show a growing 
importance of risk management systems for enterprise risk taking and profitability. In this 
paper, we investigate the impact of bank internal risk controls on bank solvency. We find that 
more formal risk control mechanisms such as a setting of the risk committee within the board 
of directors, an appointment of the chief risk officer and an use of the sophisticated risk 
measurement models such as VaR impact positively BHC solvency and reduce the risk of 
default. This is consistent with theory suggesting that enterprise risk management systems 
create value for a firm by ensuring that all material risks are assessed and managed. In 
addition, from a contingency perspective, ownership concentration and strict oversight by 
regulatory bodies over BHC capital moderates positively the relation between internal risk 
controls and BHC solvency. In contrast, bank growth strategies and regulatory restrictions on 
BHC activities influence negatively the importance of internal risk control mechanisms. 
These findings are relevant for banking regulators and practitioners. Banking 
supervisory bodies need to understand how banks manage risks and how much attention is 
paid to the risk management process by its corporate governance bodies. The monitoring and 
management of risks occur through a large set of mechanisms whose interdependency and 
effectiveness are not very well known. It appears that higher involvement and higher expertise 
of internal (board of directors) and external (bank regulator) supervisory bodies increase the 
solvency of banks and reduce their risks of default. 
The following limitations of our study provide opportunities for future research in this 
important area. First, our sample includes only publicly-listed banks. Second, BHCs in our 
sample are from countries – members of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and are 
supposed to strictly comply with its guidelines. Thus, banks from other countries might apply 
different approaches to measure and manage their risks. Third, we use a global measure for 
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BHC solvency, and additional tests should be conducted with alternative measures like profit 
and cost efficiency to evaluate the impact of internal risk controls. Finally, additional 
contingent factors could also moderate the relationship between internal risk controls and 
bank solvency.  
Despite these limitations the paper deserves some merits for having contributed to an 
enhanced understanding under which circumstances internal risk controls are effective to 
increase banks’ solvency and decrease risk of default. 
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Essay 3: 
The Impact of the Sophistication of Risk Measurement Approaches under 
Basel II on Bank Holding Companies Value  
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1. Introduction 
Banking system is a crucial element for the development and stability of the world 
economy (Caprio et al., 2007; Estrella, Park, & Peristiani, 2002). Kimball (2001) suggests 
that the quality of bank risk management and measurement systems to determine and to 
measure risk exposures as well as the level of equity to absorb potential losses due to risk-
taking activities are fundamental factors to avoid financial crises. A number of academic 
studies investigate the behavior of financial institutions under different external regulations 
and constraints (Barth et al., 2004; Pasiouras et al., 2009; Shehzad et al., 2010). Some, in 
particular, examine the efficiency of capital standards to increase banks’ solvency and to 
prevent a systemic crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2010; Podpiera, 2004). In addition, several 
researches are dedicated to the question of how well prudential ratios predict bank riskiness 
and overall stability of national financial sectors (Beltratti & Stulz, 2009; Ciháck et al., 2010). 
Our paper contributes to the literature on the efficiency of banking regulation by providing 
empirical evidence on the predictive power of bank prudential indicators. With a sample of 
192 Bank Holding Companies-Year observations collected over the period from 2008 to 
2010, we analyze under which circumstances the risk-weighted capital ratios predict the value 
of Bank-Holding Companies (BHC). We find a negative moderating effect of the 
sophistication of bank risk measurement techniques on the relation between bank solvency 
indicators and market valuation. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the capital 
regulation policies development. In section 3 we discuss previous literature on the various 
aspects of bank capital regulation and develop our working hypotheses. Section 4 introduces 
our data, variables and methodology. In section 5, we provide descriptive statistics about 
sample. Sections 6 and 7 present our results and discuss their robustness. Section 8 concludes.  
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2. Capital regulation review 
By 1985, almost all developed countries had adopted Basel Committee regulation 
guidelines that place a higher emphasis on specific capital ratio calculations (Tarullo, 2008). 
In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) decided to introduce a capital 
measurement system relying on risk-weighting of assets commonly referred to as Basel 
Capital Accord (Basel I). The baseline of this approach was to weight each bank asset with 
one of five risk categories, calculate the risk-adjusted value of each asset, and then add all 
these amounts to produce a total amount of credit risk-weighted assets. This number is used as 
a denominator to compute the risk-weighted capital ratios (Tier 1 and Tier 2) which should be 
at least 4% and 8% respectively. The numerator for Tier 1 ratio is composed from paid-up 
share capital/common stock and disclosed reserves. For Tier 2 ratio banks add the undisclosed 
reserves, revaluation reserves, general loan-losses reserves, hybrid capital instruments, and 
subordinated debts.   
Following some amendments of Basel I, including  the capital requirements for market 
risk, BCBS released in 2004 the Basel II New Capital Accord, formally called “International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework” (BCBS, 
2004a). Basel II proposed several approaches to compute the value of their risk-weighted 
assets for credit, market, and operational risks. According to the most sophisticated methods, 
Internal Rating Based approach for credit risk (IRB), and Advanced Measurement Approach 
for operational risk (AMA), banks should determine themselves the risk ratings to apply to 
different classes of assets based on their own estimates of the loss occurrence probability and 
its potential amounts. The benefits of the most sophisticated approaches under Basel II (IRB 
and AMA) are: 1) greater risk sensitivity of bank assets, 2) reliability of risk models, 3) more 
formalized and efficient risk management, and 4) potential decrease of required capital. 
Despite of these advantages, risk sensitive approaches of Basel II were criticized mainly for 
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two reasons: 1) the procyclical effects of capital regulation (Estrella, 2004; Pennacchi, 2005) 
and 2) the competitive inequality between adopters and non-adopters of most sophisticated 
approaches (Berger & Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Flannery, 2006; Hakenes et al., 2011; 
Repullo & Suarez, 2007). These critics became more pronounced with the 2008 financial 
crisis. As a response, BCBS proposed a number of significant changes of all three pillars of 
Basel II (BCBS, 2010a, 2010b). Paragraph 6 of the Basel III a global regulatory framework 
for more resilient banks and banking systems illustrates the general lines of proposed 
changes: 
“To address the market failures revealed by the crisis, the Committee is 
introducing a number of fundamental reforms to the international regulatory 
framework. The reforms strengthen bank-level, or microprudential, regulation, 
which will help raise the resilience of individual banking institutions to periods 
of stress. The reforms also have a macroprudential focus, addressing system-
wide risks that can build up across the banking sector as well as the 
procyclical amplification of these risks over time. Clearly these micro and 
macroprudential approaches to supervision are interrelated, as greater 
resilience at the individual bank level reduces the risk of system-wide 
shocks.”(p. 2) 
 
Concerning Pillar 1 of Basel II, new standards proposed the following amendments: a) 
greater capital requirements for certain products, b) more strengthened capital requirements 
for assets held in trading book, c) more strengthened capital treatment of liquidity, and d) 
supervision of capital requirements over the credit cycle (Tarullo, 2008). Capital ratios in 
their quantitative aspects were also a subject of significant changes under Basel III. 
Particularly, Tier 1 ratio is required to be at least 6% of risk-weighted assets from which at 
least 4.5% should be made of common equity. Moreover, new rules introduced two absolutely 
new concepts: the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer. The first one has 
a general purpose to ensure that banks build up additional capital outside periods of stress 
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which can be drawn as losses incur, while the former should be designed to ensure that 
banking sector capital requirements take into account the macro-financial environment in 
which banks operate. The capital conservation buffer should be 2.5% of risk-weighted assets 
and comprised of common equity Tier 1. The countercyclical buffer ranges between 0 and 
2.5% of risk-weighted assets and depends on the macroeconomic situation of geographic 
regions in which a bank operates. Additionally, the Basel III regulation requires banks to 
present a simple non-risk based leverage ratio. Figure 1 illustrates these requirements. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Basel III capital framework______________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Source: Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, BIS, 2010, p. 
64.  
 
3. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The impact of a capital regulation on bank behavior was a subject of numerous 
academic studies (Barth et al., 2008; Stolz et al., 2011). The agency cost hypothesis suggests 
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that a high leverage or eventually a low capital-to-assets ratio reduces the agency costs of 
shareholders and aligns their interests with those of firm managers (Danielsson et al., 2002; 
Demsetz, Saidenberg, & Strahan, 1996). Traditional investment theory predicts that bank 
shareholders have a direct interest to increase bank leverage to maximize the bank value. 
However, the relationship between the bank leverage and bank value is not monotonic 
(Shrieves et al., 1992). When the leverage becomes excessively high, its further increases will 
lower bank value, because of higher expected costs of financial distress or bankruptcy. 
Reasons why regulators require banks to hold capital at certain levels converge with 
those of bank depositors and other debt holders. By setting the minimum capital requirements, 
regulators intend to: a) protect national economies against the costs of financial distress, b) 
reduce the information asymmetry between bank shareholders and “uninsured” depositors, 
and c) preserve a certain market discipline that weakened, because of different safety 
measures taken by government such as deposit insurance, payment guarantees, and access to 
the different mark downs (Berger et al., 1995). Although the impact of capital requirements 
on bank behavior has been extensively studied (Kaplanski & Levy, 2007; Kim & Santomero, 
1988; Rime, 2001), results remain controversial. Are these requirements efficient in shaping 
bank risk-taking and reducing moral hazard problems due to shareholder incentives to choose 
excessively risky business strategies? While stringent capital requirements are associated with 
less non-performing loans (Barth et al., 2004) and greater cost efficiency (Pasiouras et al., 
2009), several studies suggest that they are not robustly linked with the stability of the 
banking system (Barth et al., 2008; González, 2005). Jacques et al. (1997) and Shrieves et al. 
(1992) stress that risk-sensitive capital standards are the efficient tools to increase capital 
ratios and to reduce an excessive risk-taking in commercial banks. In contrast, Rime (2001) 
infers that regulatory pressures are positively related with bank level of capital, but have no 
impact on its risk-taking strategies. Moreover, Acharya et al. (2011) evoke that banks during 
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the time of 2007-2009 financial crisis increased their prudential capital, but this augmentation 
was mainly due by the raise of debt-like hybrid capital, while the common equity was 
decreased by the distribution of dividends.  
Several studies suggest that regulators together with setting quantitative standards for 
capital ratios and other requirements and restrictions on bank activities should also consider 
banks corporate governance aspects (Laeven et al., 2009; Shehzad et al., 2010). Particularly, 
banks with concentrated shareholdings might react differently to the existing regulation than 
widely-held financial institutions. Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) argue, that the relation between 
bank risk-taking and bank value is influenced by the incentives of three agents – the deposit 
insurer, the shareholder, and the manager. The degree at which the bank capitalization 
impacts its risk-taking behavior depends upon which influence prevail in setting bank 
business strategies. Contrarily to the conventional point of view, a bank in which management 
interests prevail may practice higher risk strategies as bank capitalization increases. 
  
3.1. Risk-weighted capital ratios under Basel II and BHC market value  
According to regulators, risk-weighted capital ratios should reveal a current state of 
bank solvency. So far, academic research has produced some empirical evidence on a 
predictive power of bank capital ratios. Kim and Santomero (1988) suggest that risk-related 
capital regulation standards are an effective tool in predicting bank default risk. Avery and 
Berger (1991) infer that banks with higher ratios of risk-weighted assets to un-weighted assets 
(higher risk-taking) have poorer predicted performance. Berger (1995) found that bank 
capital-asset ratio (CAR) and return on equity (ROE) are positively related, and this 
relationship is statistically and economically significant. Färe et al. (2004) show, that risk-
based capital standards have a significant impact on bank business efficiency by optimizing 
the mix of outputs and inputs (allocative efficiency). Estrella et al. (2002) and Čihák et al. 
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(2010) found that capital ratios (Tier 1 ratio, Total Capital ratio, Leverage ratio) can be used 
as good predictors for banking crisis. Studying the bank performance during recent 2007-
2009 financial crisis, Beltratti and Stulz (2009) found that banks with higher Tier 1 ratio 
exhibited a better performance, while Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) did not find a strong 
relationship between stock returns and the level of Tier 1 capital.  
If the relation between bank performance and capital ratios is not robustly confirmed by 
existing empirical results, the BHC value – the present value of the potential future profits, 
might be stronger related to bank solvency. Demsetz et al. (1996) found that banks with 
higher market value have higher common equity capital and lower asset risk than banks with 
a lower franchise value. Barrios and Blanco (2003) studying a sample of Spanish banks, infer 
that there exists an optimal level of bank capital which maximizes the market value of a bank. 
However, if the optimal capital ratio goes below a legally required level, the bank should hold 
an excess of equity and operate with an inefficient financial structure.  
As pointed out in Section 2, capital ratios under Basel regulation (Tier 1, Tier 2, and 
Total Capital Ratio) could be determined according to different approaches. Advanced 
approaches such as IRB for credit risks and AMA for operational risks are based on BHC own 
estimates of probabilities that losses occur and their potential amounts. Scholars and 
practitioners agree that the greater risk sensitivity in capital requirements is a major 
advancement in banking regulation. Advanced approaches allow banks to calibrate better 
capital requirements to the actual risk of a particular bank. Risk exposures are computed using 
the financial information specific to particular BHC assets and borrowers quality. Logically, 
capital ratios determined under the advanced approaches should give more accurate 
information concerning bank solvency. Nevertheless, there are some critics related to 
computation methodologies and disclosures that banks provide. Herring (2005), among other 
critical points of advanced approaches, suggests that the diversity of methods and rules given 
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to banks under Internal Ratings Based approach (IRB) makes capital ratios incomparable 
across banks even if they properly disclose underlying data and methods. Moreover, in many 
countries the supervisors are not ready to effectively monitor the application of advanced 
approaches. Other problem comes from the internationality of banks. It is still difficult to 
apply same monitoring rules for bank home and host supervisors, especially if it concerns 
BHC from emerging economies (Powell, 2004). Another problem is related to the Pillar 3 of 
Basel II, market disclosures. This pillar is seen by academicians as the weakest and the least 
developed (Barth et al., 2008; Tarullo, 2008). Today, the risk measurement disclosures are not 
comparable across banks. Our work on data collection revealed that more advanced 
approaches banks apply, higher is the divergence in risk measurement disclosures. According 
to Danielsson et al. (2002), even if BHC have adopted advanced approaches, it does not have 
any intention to disclose properly risk measurement procedures and critical parameters. To 
avoid completely the information sharing with regulators and other agents, banks might adopt 
a dual risk measurement system: standardized approaches for regulatory purposes and risk-
sensitive for private ends. In contrast, capital ratios determined under standardized approaches 
are more comprehensive for investors and depositors. To compute these ratios, banks do not 
have a choice of tools and apply the relatively unified methodologies (Herring, 2005; Tarullo, 
2008). 
These arguments lead to the following testable predictions. First, stronger capital ratios 
should be associated with a higher BHC market value. Second, the sophistication of bank risk 
measurement approaches under Basel II will moderate negatively the predictive power of 
capital ratios, because of a high diversity of computation methodologies applied by banks and 
weak public disclosures.  
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4. Data, variables and methodology 
4.1. Sample and data 
To test our hypotheses we use a sample of 183 bank-year observations for 66 Bank 
Holding Companies including observations for 2008, 2009, and 2010. We built our sample 
using BHC annual risk and corporate governance reports, as well as The Banker and 
Worldscope databases. First, we chose BHC from country-members of Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision3. Then, we excluded countries in which, Basel II New Capital Accord 
had not been enforced before 2008 to avoid discrepancy in BHC risk measurement 
approaches. For the remaining countries, we extracted data on BHC from The Banker 
Database Top 1000 Rankings. To build a balanced sample and exclude an overweighting of 
BHC from certain countries, we limited our sample to a maximum of 10 publicly listed BHC 
per country (Caprio et al., 2007; Laeven et al., 2009). When a country had only one BHC, we 
decided not to include it in the sample. For each bank-year observation we manually collected 
data on the Basel II risk measurement approaches from the risk management reports, often 
called Basel II Pillar 3 reports. Information on BHC annual return on assets, risk-weighted 
capital ratios, and non-performing loans was obtained from the Banker database, while other 
financial data was collected from the Worldscope database. Data for country-level control 
variables comes from the Financial Development Report 2010 Executive Opinion Survey.  
 
4.2. BHC franchise value measure 
Stock price data from publicly traded BHC is one of few available resilient sources to 
measure bank’s valuation by independent parties. In this study we approximate the bank value 
                                                 
3
 The Committee's members come from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Source: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm 
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by Tobin’s Q that is computed as the sum of bank market value of equity (MVE) and book 
value of liabilities (BVL) divided by book value of bank assets (BVA) excluding goodwill:  
                                                            MVE + BVL 
                             Tobin’s Q =      
                                                          BVA - Goodwill 
                                                  
Tobin’s Q is the most popular proxy of bank market value in academic research (Caprio 
et al., 2007; Demsetz et al., 1996; González, 2005). Tobin’s Q combines the market valuation 
of the bank and the replacement value of bank’s existing assets and is a function of two 
factors: 1) bank-specific variables which impact the bank future growth opportunities, and 2) 
country-specific variables which represent the generosity of the governmental safety net, 
financial market development, banking industry market structure, and others (Allen & Rai, 
1996). Jones et al. (2011) infer that banks with higher Tobin’s Q before the financial crisis of 
2007-2008 experienced lower declines in equity during the time of the financial turbulence. 
Thus, the informational significance of Tobin’s Q appears to persist even in times of 
economic contractions.  
 
 
4.3. BHC risk-weighted capital ratios 
In this paper we use two risk-weighted capital ratios required by Basel II and reported 
by BHCs: BIS Tier 1 Ratio and BIS Total Capital Ratio, hereafter Tier 1 and Capital ratios. 
Except national regulations of Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Africa, the required 
minimum levels of these ratios should be respectively 4% and 8% (Table 4). In the academic 
literature the risk-weighted capital ratios are mainly used to proxy bank soundness (Rime, 
2001; Shehzad et al., 2010; Stolz et al., 2011). In our view, the risk-weighted capital ratios 
have a considerable advantage over other proxies of bank solvency, because they combine 
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two complementary factors: BHC risk-taking strategy, and the safeguard measures against 
risk-taking activities, e.g. a level of capital to absorb potential losses. 
 
4.4. Sophistication of risk measurement under Basel II 
To proxy the sophistication of BHC risk measurement approaches for its risks we 
constructed our internal index (B2_score) reflecting the magnitude of the adoption of 
advanced approaches under Basel II. This index is the sum of fractions of risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) for credit, market, and operational risks computed under the advanced approaches to 
total reported RWA: 
 
          RWA under IRB for Credit Risk                RWA under VaR for Market Risk              RWA under AMA for Operational Risk 
  B2_score =     --------------------------------------        +       -----------------------------------------      +     ---------------------------------------------- 
                                  Total RWA                                                  Total RWA                                                    Total RWA     
 
According to Basel II rules, the IRB itself might be of different degrees of 
sophistication, e.g. Advanced Internal-Ratings Based approach and Foundation Internal-
Ratings Based approach depending on the fact whether the bank is able to produce its own 
estimates of default exposures, loss if default occurred, and maturity of the exposure. 
Unfortunately, only few BHC report such detailed information, thus, we were not able to 
collect the information on this level. The majority of BHC in our sample applies different 
approaches to quantify their risks for different subsidiaries. Moreover, for different categories 
of assets, banks often apply the mix of allowed approaches. The example of UBS Group 
illustrates the partial application of different approaches for credit risk exposures: 
 
“…The standardized approach is generally applied where it is not 
possible to use the advanced IRB approach and/or where an exemption from 
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the advanced IRB approach has been granted by FINMA4. The standardized 
approach requires banks to use risk assessments prepared by External Credit 
Assessment Institutions (ECAI) or Export Credit Agencies to determine the risk 
weightings applied to rated counterparties. We use ECAI risk assessments 
to determine the risk weightings for the following classes of exposure:  
–– central governments and central banks, 
–– regional governments and local authorities, 
–– multilateral development banks, 
–– institutions, 
–– corporates. 
We selected three FINMA-recognized external credit assessment 
institutions for this purpose: Moody’s Investors Service, Standard and Poor’s 
Ratings Group and Fitch Group. The mapping of external ratings to the 
standardized approach risk weights is determined by FINMA and published on 
its website…” (UBS Group 2010 Annual Report, p. 121). 
 
According to our sample, credit risk is the biggest risk that BHCs face, and the ratio of 
credit RWA to total RWA ranges from sixty to ninety percent. Thus, as an alternative 
measure of risk measurement sophistication, we chose a simple dummy variable indicating if 
BHC has adopted the internal-ratings based approach at least for a part of its credit RWA 
(IRB).  
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 FINMA is Swiss Finanical Market Supervisory Authority, note from authors 
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4.5. Control variables 
In our study we use two sets of control variables. The first set includes variables 
controlling for different factors specific to banks and is made of loan to assets ratio (Loan) 
and the natural logarithm of assets (Size). The second set of variables controls for country 
characteristics and consists of a variable for the corporate governance standards development 
(Governance), a variable for the national banking system stability (Stability), and a variable 
for the national banking financial services development (Sophistic). All these variables are 
taken from the Financial Development Report 2010 Executive Opinion Survey (Bilodeau, 
2010). Governance is an index measuring the efficiency of country corporate governance 
standards. It is based on the following items: 1) extent of incentive-based compensation, 2) 
efficacy of corporate boards, 3) reliance on professional management, 4) willingness to 
delegate, 5) strength of auditing and reporting standards, 6) ethical behaviour of firms, and 7) 
protection of minority shareholders’ interests. Stability is an index measuring the national 
banking system stability. It is based on the following items: 1) frequency of banking crises, 2) 
financial strength indicator, 3) measures of real estate bubbles, 4) financial stress measures, 5) 
Tier 1 capital ratio, and 6) output loss during banking crisis. Sophistic is an index measuring 
the national banking financial services development. It is formed from the following 
components: 1) financial system size, 2) index of the efficiency of national financial system, 
and 3) quality of financial information disclosures. All variables are described in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Variables definitions 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Tobin’s Q that equals to Market value of equity plus the Book value of liabilities divided by 
the Book value of assets. 
 
Tier Tier 1 ratio as reported at the end of reporting year. 
 
BIS_Ratio Total capital ratio as reported at the end of reporting year (Tier 3 ratio). 
 
IRB Dummy variable that takes 1 if BHC adopted the Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach for at 
least a part of its credit risk-weighted assets. 
 
B2_Score Index of risk measurement approaches sophistication under Basel II. This index is the sum of 
fractions of risk-weighted assets (RWA) for credit, market, and operational risks computed 
under the advanced approaches to total reported RWA. 
 
Loan Ratio of bank total loans to total assets. 
 
Size Natural logarithm of BHC total assets. 
 
Governance Index measuring the efficiency of country corporate governance standards. It is formed from 
following measures: 1) extent of incentive-based compensation, 2) efficacy of corporate 
boards, 3) reliance on professional management, 4) willingness to delegate, 5) strength of 
auditing and reporting standards, 6) ethical behaviour of firms, and 7) protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests. This index is ranged between 1 and 7. Higher values indicate a higher 
development of corporate governance practices in a country. 
Stability Index measuring the national banking system stability. It is formed from the following 
components: 1) frequency of banking crises, 2) financial strength indicator, 3) measures of 
real estate bubbles, 4) financial stress measures, 5) Tier 1 capital ratio, and 6) output loss 
during banking crisis. This index is ranged between 1 and 7. Higher values indicate a higher 
stability of a banking system. 
Sophistic Index measuring the national banking financial services development. It is formed from the 
following components: 1) financial system size measures, 2) efficiency of national financial 
systems measures, and 3) quality of financial information disclosures. This index is ranged 
between 1 and 7. Higher values indicate a higher sophistication of financial services in a 
country. 
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4.6. Empirical models 
 
To test our hypotheses we built the following base model: 
 
Q = β0 + β1* BIS_Ratioit (Tierit) + β2* B2_Scoreit (IRBit) + ∑ βx*Xit + ∑ βy*Yit + eit 
 
, where subscripts i denotes individual BHC (i = 1,2…, 66), t time period (t = 2008,…, 
2010) while X is a set of bank-level control variables and Y is a set of variables controlling 
for country characteristics. As we work with longitudinal, cross-country data, we controlled 
for country and BHC fixed effects.  
 
5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. On average, Tobin’s Q amounts 
to 1.242 with a minimum of 0.926 and maximum of 2.022. Tier 1 and Capital ratios, on 
average, are significantly higher than required minimum levels and equal to 11.1% and 14.1% 
respectively. No prudential ratio of bank-year observations of our sample is below the 
required level. The average of B2_Score is lower than 0.5 with the highest value of 0.966. It 
means that no financial institution of our sample fully applied the advanced approaches for its 
risk exposures. The minimum level of B2_Score is 0 meaning that several BHC apply only 
standard approaches to determine their risk-weighted assets. Particularly, no bank from India 
and Saudi Arabia adopted advanced approaches.  
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Table 2 
         
Descriptive statistics and Skewness-Kurtosis test 
  
  
Nb of 
obs. Mean S.d. Min. Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Skewness - 
Kurtosis Test 
Tobin's Q 183 1.242 0.167 0.926 2.022 1.054 5.567 0.00*** 
Tier 183 0.111 0.035 0.051 0.331 2.066 11.727 0.00*** 
BIS_Ratio 183 0.141 0.037 0.086 0.339 2.211 11.456 0.00*** 
IRB 183 0.678 0.469 0.000 1.000 -0.760 1.578 n.a. 
B2_Score 183 0.454 0.356 0.000 0.966 -0.264 1.429 0.00*** 
Loan 183 0.623 0.164 0.153 0.916 -0.620 3.095 0.00*** 
Size 183 19.088 1.651 14.959 21.960 -0.194 2.234 0.00*** 
Governance 183 4.994 0.721 3.600 6.100 -0.773 2.643 n.a. 
Stability 183 4.928 0.910 3.300 6.400 -0.183 1.881 n.a. 
Sophistic 183 4.584 0.620 3.100 5.400 -0.535 2.167 n.a. 
 
In Table 3 we present the descriptive statistics by countries. The highest values of 
Tobin’s Q is exhibited by banks from South Africa, Sweden, and Spain (1.437, 1.426, and 
1.412), while the Tobin’s Q of BHCs from Asian countries is close to 1. Nevertheless, Asian 
banks, except those from Hong Kong, show relatively high risk measurement sophistication. 
According to our index B2_Score, the most sophisticated banks in risk measurement have 
their headquarters in Germany (0.841), Sweden (0.799), Belgium (0.734), and Australia 
(0.731). Banking groups from South Africa exhibit the highest values of prudential ratios 
(Tier = 18.3%, BIS_Ratio = 22.1%). The lowest levels of capital ratios are reported by BHCs 
from Italy and Spain, which also exhibit the sophistication of risk measurement below the 
sample average.  
The proportion of traditional lending activities (Loan) is more or less identical across 
countries of our sample. Only BHCs from Germany and France demonstrate relatively low 
proportion of loans to total assets (20.8% and 36.9%). The biggest BHCs in term of total 
assets are from Germany and France, while the smallest are from Saudi Arabia and South 
Africa.  
Variable, Governance, indicates that the highest corporate governance standards are in 
Sweden (6.1) and Canada (5.7) while the poorest are in Italy with its outstanding value of 3.6. 
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The most stable banking systems are in Saudi Arabia (Stability = 6.4), Switzerland, Hong 
Kong, and Canada (Stability = 5.6). More risky environment is showed in United Kingdom 
(3.3), India (3.5), Spain (3.8), and Sweden (3.9). In general, the banking financial services are 
well developed in countries of our sample. Only India and South Africa have remarkably low 
values of Sophistic index, 3.1 and 3.7 correspondingly. 
 
Table 3 
 
Average figures grouped per country 
  
 
Nb. 
of 
Obs. 
Tobin's 
Q Tier BIS_Ratio IRB B2_Score Loan Size Governance Stability Sophistic 
            
Australia 10 1.217 0.089 0.120 1.000 0.731 0.703 19.453 5.500 5.500 5.100 
Belgium 6 1.362 0.116 0.141 1.000 0.734 0.619 20.238 5.100 4.500 4.900 
Italy 3 1.328 0.075 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.649 17.718 3.600 5.100 4.100 
Canada 18 1.139 0.117 0.146 0.722 0.601 0.544 19.208 5.700 5.600 4.800 
France 7 1.186 0.098 0.123 1.000 0.568 0.369 21.464 4.900 4.600 4.100 
Germany 3 1.181 0.117 0.134 1.000 0.841 0.208 21.660 5.400 4.200 4.300 
Hong Kong 9 1.024 0.104 0.157 0.333 0.240 0.655 16.945 5.100 5.600 5.300 
India 3 1.267 0.113 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.542 18.457 4.400 3.500 3.100 
Italy 24 1.345 0.079 0.113 0.500 0.205 0.722 18.991 3.600 5.100 4.100 
Japan 17 1.063 0.100 0.129 1.000 0.629 0.599 19.987 5.100 4.000 5.200 
Saudi Arabia 18 1.210 0.138 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.715 17.128 5.000 6.400 3.500 
Singapore 9 1.074 0.140 0.169 1.000 0.643 0.564 18.881 5.600 5.800 4.600 
South Africa 7 1.437 0.183 0.221 0.571 0.418 0.683 17.283 5.300 5.200 3.700 
Spain 16 1.412 0.088 0.116 0.750 0.382 0.731 19.215 4.300 3.800 5.200 
Sweden 11 1.426 0.098 0.139 1.000 0.799 0.660 19.741 6.100 3.900 4.800 
Switzerland 12 1.286 0.142 0.161 0.583 0.482 0.607 18.679 5.400 5.600 4.500 
United 
Kingdom 10 1.196 0.121 0.153 1.000 0.688 0.434 21.159 5.400 3.300 5.400 
 
           
Total 183 1.242 0.111 0.141 0.678 0.454 0.623 19.088 4.994 4.928 4.584 
 
 
Table 4 presents the pair-wise correlation matrix. Correlation coefficients between our 
variables of interest (B2_Score, IRB, BIS_Ratio, and Tier) do not present special risk of 
multicollinearity.  
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Table 4 
 
Correlation among variables 
                    
  Tobin Tier BIS_Ratio IRB B2_Score Loan Size Governance Stability 
  
                  
Tier 0.050         
 
0.502         
BIS_Ratio 0.187 0.811        
 
0.011 0.000        
IRB -0.138 -0.168 -0.143       
 
0.062 0.023 0.053       
B2_Score -0.092 -0.087 -0.036 0.834      
 
0.218 0.239 0.627 0.000      
Loan 0.306 -0.035 -0.050 -0.445 -0.543     
 
0.000 0.636 0.499 0.000 0.000     
Size -0.045 -0.316 -0.257 0.724 0.703 -0.672    
 
0.545 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Governance -0.270 0.389 0.369 0.297 0.470 -0.278 0.107   
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.151   
Stability -0.195 0.290 0.227 -0.410 -0.316 0.184 -0.511 0.065  
 
0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.385  
Sophistic -0.196 -0.248 -0.185 0.500 0.472 -0.113 0.351 0.307 -0.512 
 
0.008 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
                  
 
 
6. Regression results 
The first part of our empirical analysis investigates the impact of risk-weighted capital 
ratios on BHC value measured by Tobin’s Q. We report these results in models 5-1 and 5-2 of 
Table 5. To ensure a rigorous evaluation, we conduct several tests with alternative measures 
of the bank solvency: Tier 1 Ratio (Tier) and Total Capital ratio (BIS_Ratio). Moreover, we 
included in all these models the variables quantifying the sophistication of BHC risk 
measurement approaches under Basel II (B2_Score and IRB). Both models are well-fitted 
with a high R-squared values (0.672, 0.761). These high values of R-squared are partially 
explained by the fact that we control for country and year fixed effects. 
The results confirm our prediction that higher capital ratios are associated with higher 
BHC market valuation. The coefficients of variables Tier and BIS_Ratio are empirically 
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significant at 1% level and positive. These findings are consistent with the evidence showed 
by Estrella et al. (2002), Čihák et al. (2010), and Beltratti and Stulz (2009). Despite of 
arguments that capital levels required by Basel II are not efficient from pure economic point 
of view (Barrios et al., 2003), our empirical analysis showed that BHC market capitalization 
is a direct function of bank equity level and hybrid instruments. 
The interesting results were found for our variables measuring BHC risk measurement 
sophistication (B2_Score and IRB). While the sophistication in credit risk measurement (IRB) 
is negatively related to bank charter value, the overall sophistication in measurement 
(B2_Score) is positive and significant at usual levels. This could mean that the advanced 
approaches for market and operational risks are not well valuated by capital markets.  
Regarding the coefficients of the unit-level control variables, it is worth to note some 
interesting findings. All coefficients of Loan are significant at 1% level implying that banks 
focusing on traditional banking lending business are better valued by markets. Size seems to 
be also positively and significantly related to bank market valuation.  
On the side of country-level, it is worth to note that coefficients for our measure of the 
strength of corporate governance standards, Governance, are negative and significant 
implying that BHC from countries with more advanced corporate governance practices are 
poorer valuated by capital markets. 
In our second set of models reported in Table 5 (from 5-3 to 5-6), we test whether the 
sophistication of risk measurement approaches proposed by Basel II has moderating effects 
on the relation between risk-weighted capital ratios and BHC value. To reduce the 
multicollinearity problem, we enter each interaction term separately. The main finding of this 
analysis is that our second proposition is empirically confirmed. The coefficients of all four 
interaction terms are significant at 1% level and have predicted (negative) signs. Despite the 
fact that coefficients of moderating variables (IRB and B2_Score) alone exhibit different and 
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significant signs, the negative moderation effects are observed for both our variables of 
interest. The adoption of sophisticated, risk-sensitive measurement approaches decreases 
significantly the predictive power of bank risk-weighted capital ratios for bank market value.  
 
 
7. Robustness tests 
Additionally, we performed several robustness tests. First, we replaced Tobin’s Q by 
the accounting measure of BHC profitability, the return on assets (ROA). The coefficients of 
our variable of interest (Tier and BIS_Ratio) remain positive and significant at 1% level. 
Moreover, when we control for BHC risks measured by non-performing loans (NPL) the 
results do not change.  
Second, following Stolz and Wedow (2011), instead of regressing BHC value on risk-
weighted capital ratios, we used the capital buffers, i.e. excesses of Capital and Tier 1 ratios 
over the minimum required levels: 
                       BUFCR = Actual Capital Ratio Reported – Minimum required level 
BUFTier1  = Actual Tier 1 Ratio Reported – Minimum required level 
Our results remain absolutely similar to those reported in Table 5.  
Third, considering a potential undermining of our analysis by recent financial crisis, we 
performed distinct analysis for observations corresponding to each year, i.e. 2008, 2009, and 
2010. Results are reported in Table 6. With a few exceptions, the coefficients of our variables 
of interest remain significant and have predicted signs. This time-comparison allows us to 
generalize our findings across different stages of a business cycle.  
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Table 5 
 
Capital ratios, sophistication of risk measurement approaches and BHC market valuation 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions. Sample consists of 183 bank-year observations from 17 
countries for the period from 2008 to 2010. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q adopted to financial 
institutions. In models 5-1 and 5-2 we regress BHC market valuation on capital ratios (Tier 1 and Total 
Capital Ratio). Models 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6 report the results of the moderation of BHC risk measurement 
approaches on the relation between bank market valuation and capital ratios. 
  
Model 5-1 Model 5-2  Model 5-3 Model 5-4 Model 5-5 Model 5-6 
                
Tier 1.563***  
 
2.532*** 2.376***   
 (0.356)  
 
(0.378) (0.385)   
BIS_Ratio  2.356*** 
 
   3.089*** 2.902*** 
  (0.254) 
 
   (0.278) (0.290) 
IRB -0.133*** -0.108***  0.156** -0.133*** 0.188*** -0.108*** 
 (0.0351) (0.0300)  (0.0640) (0.0332) (0.0652) (0.0290) 
B2_Score 0.131*** 0.116***  0.127*** 0.508*** 0.129*** 0.426*** 
 (0.0498) (0.0425)  (0.0461) (0.0984) (0.0397) (0.0972) 
Loan 0.281*** 0.271***  0.216** 0.194** 0.230*** 0.211*** 
 (0.0905) (0.0769)  (0.0848) (0.0881) (0.0721) (0.0762) 
Size 0.0274** 0.0207**  0.0273** 0.0253** 0.0232** 0.0196** 
 (0.0117) (0.00970)  (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.00905) (0.00938) 
Governance -0.136*** -0.171***  -0.163*** -0.161*** -0.193*** -0.189*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0375)  (0.0417) (0.0427) (0.0352) (0.0366) 
Stability -0.0118 0.000807  -0.0146 -0.0122 0.00482 0.00474 
 (0.0203) (0.0174)  (0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0162) (0.0168) 
Sophistic 0.0210 0.0481  0.0477 0.0406 0.0735** 0.0653** 
 (0.0368) (0.0316)  (0.0344) (0.0351) (0.0298) (0.0309) 
Tier * IRB    -2.756***    
    (0.527)    
Tier * B2_Score      -3.468***   
      (0.794)   
BIS_Ratio * IRB       -2.270***  
       (0.452)  
BIS_Ratio * B2_Score        -2.232*** 
        (0.635) 
Country FE yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes  yes yes yes yes 
Constant 1.022*** 0.990***  0.977*** 1.049*** 0.843*** 0.959*** 
 (0.332) (0.282)  (0.307) (0.314) (0.264) (0.273) 
         
Observations 183 183  183 183 183 183 
R-squared 0.672 0.761   0.720 0.707 0.794 0.778 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Concerning our moderator variables we executed following tests. We included in each 
corresponding model the quadratic terms of Tier, BIS_Ratio, IRB and B2_Score, to test for 
nonlinearity concerns. All these terms entered non-significantly and confirmed the robustness 
of our moderation effects.  
 
8. Discussion and conclusion 
Recent crisis in the financial sector showed a growing importance of risk measurement 
and management systems for banks’ solvency and overall economic stability. Banking sector 
supervisory bodies responded to these turbulences by strengthening the actual capital 
regulation standards. Nevertheless, the adoption of risk-sensitive rules under Basel II 
perfectly coincided with the beginning of the financial crisis that jeopardized their 
introduction in practice. The efficiency or eventually inefficiency of Basel II standards was 
not rigorously assessed by existing studies.  
In this paper, we investigate the impact of risk-weighted capital ratios on BHC value – 
the profit-generation capacity. We found that the prudential ratios reported under Basel II 
rules might predict bank market valuation. Similar results were reported by Estrella et al. 
(2002), Čihák et al. (2010), and Beltratti and Stulz (2009). However, from the contingency 
perspective, the sophistication in risk measurement seems to significantly decrease a 
predictive power of risk-weighted capital ratios for BHC value. The prudential indicators of 
banks that apply standardized approaches to measure their risk exposures reveal better the 
actual risk-taking and are considered by financial markets. If the capital ratios are determined 
using sophisticated approaches, higher values of them are not necessarily translated to a 
higher market valuation of bank equities.  
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Table 6 
 
Capital ratios, sophistication of risk measurement approaches and BHC market valuation 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for different years. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q adopted to financial institutions. In models 6-1, 6-2, 6-7, 6-8, 6-13, and 6-14 we regress BHC market valuation on capital 
ratios (Tier 1 and Total Capital Ratio). Other models report the results of the moderation of BHC risk measurement approaches on the relation between bank market valuation and capital ratios. 
  2008 2009 2010 
  M. 6-1 M. 6-2 M. 6-3 M. 6-4 M. 6-5 M. 6-6 M. 6-7 M. 6-8 M. 6-9 M. 6-10 M. 6-11 M. 6-12 M. 6-13 M. 6-14 M. 6-15 M. 6-16 M. 6-17 M. 6-18 
Tier 1.998***  2.222*** 2.269***   1.335*  3.125*** 2.785***   2.566**  4.402*** 3.840***   
 (0.524)  (0.517) (0.525)   (0.749)  (0.825) (0.856)   (0.981)  (1.036) (1.033)   
BIS_Ratio 
 2.170***   2.578*** 2.501***   2.488***   3.136*** 2.891***   2.688***   4.100*** 3.795*** 
 
 (0.442)   (0.502) (0.525)   (0.450)   (0.480) (0.506)   (0.569)   (0.616) (0.652) 
IRB -0.011 -0.006 0.149 -0.038 0.162 -0.017 -0.129* -0.109** 0.281** -0.121** 0.233* -0.101* -0.213*** -0.175*** 0.307* -0.190*** 0.331** -0.168*** 
 (0.065) (0.059) (0.104) (0.065) (0.120) (0.061) (0.064) (0.051) (0.126) (0.059) (0.132) (0.050) (0.071) (0.062) (0.169) (0.067) (0.143) (0.057) 
B2_Score (0.057) 0.043 0.053 0.404* 0.045 0.262 0.099 0.094 0.075 0.587*** 0.096 0.362* 0.240** 0.214** 0.216** 0.790*** 0.239*** 0.759*** 
 (0.094) (0.086) (0.091) (0.207) (0.084) (0.207) (0.093) (0.074) (0.083) (0.190) (0.068) (0.180) (0.104) (0.089) (0.093) (0.229) (0.078) (0.208) 
Loan 0.259* 0.188 0.148 0.152 0.109 0.127 0.319* 0.325** 0.266 0.230 0.265* 0.260* 0.447** 0.417** 0.274 0.206 0.349** 0.287 
 (0.145) (0.133) (0.151) (0.151) (0.139) (0.142) (0.180) (0.142) (0.160) (0.169) (0.134) (0.145) (0.210) (0.178) (0.195) (0.216) (0.155) (0.170) 
Size 0.026 0.008 0.021 0.017 0.007 0.006 0.029 0.028 0.037* 0.033 0.033** 0.028* 0.028 0.021 0.023 0.018 0.022 0.015 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) 
Governance -0.049 -0.047 -0.051 -0.061 -0.049 -0.053 -0.112 -0.164** -0.156* -0.150* -0.176*** -0.172** -0.224** -0.244*** -0.300*** -0.275*** -0.309*** -0.295*** 
 (0.051) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.046) (0.089) (0.069) (0.080) (0.084) (0.064) (0.068) (0.101) (0.082) (0.093) (0.096) (0.073) (0.078) 
Stability -0.034 -0.035 -0.032 -0.029 -0.034 -0.033 -0.006 0.007 -0.022 -0.017 0.008 0.008 -0.035 -0.005 -0.033 -0.029 0.011 0.008 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.039) (0.032) (0.035) (0.037) (0.029) (0.031) (0.043) 0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.033) (0.035) 
Sophistic 0.110 0.115* 0.122* 0.108 0.133* 0.123* 0.038 0.059 0.083 0.069 0.085 0.073 0.043 0.089 0.113 0.099 0.163** 0.150** 
 (0.073) (0.066) (0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.066) (0.072) (0.057) (0.065) (0.067) (0.054) (0.057) (0.079) (0.069) (0.074) (0.077) (0.063) (0.067) 
Tier * IRB 
  -1.905*       -3.92***       -4.432***    
 
  (0.994)       (1.079)       (1.332)    
Tier * B2_Score 
   -3.096*       -4.70***       -5.149**   
 
   (1.658)       (1.631)       (1.940)   
BIS_Ratio * IRB 
    -1.503       -2.58***       -3.60***  
 
    (0.940)       (0.935)       (0.948)  
BIS_Ratio * B2_Score 
     -1.585       -2.048       -3.792*** 
 
     (1.367)       (1.257)       (1.328) 
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant 0.440 0.698 0.542 0.664 0.651 0.727 0.749 0.651 0.549 0.688 0.460 0.609 1.211* 1.011 1.270** 1.379** 0.750 0.971* 
 (0.533) (0.472) (0.516) (0.528) (0.462) (0.470) (0.639) (0.508) (0.568) (0.592) (0.479) (0.500) (0.702) (0.611) (0.627) (0.657) (0.533) (0.563) 
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55 66 66 66 66 66 66 62 62 62 62 62 62 
R-squared 0.806 0.838 0.826 0.825 0.850 0.844 0.672 0.793 0.750 0.726 0.824 0.805 0.701 0.775 0.767 0.747 0.836 0.814 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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These findings are relevant for regulators and other interested parties, and question the 
effectiveness of risk-sensitive measurement approaches. Especially in the light, that the 
adoption of IRB and AMA require considerable investments in bank risk management.  
The following limitations of our study provide opportunities for future research in this 
area. First, our sample includes only publicly-listed banks and the situation could be different 
for privately held financial institutions. Second, BHCs in our sample are from countries – 
members of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and are supposed to strictly comply 
with its guidelines. Thus, banks from other countries might apply different approaches to 
measure their risks. Third, we use a global measure for BHC value, and additional tests 
should be conducted with alternative measures like stock returns, profit and cost efficiency to 
evaluate the impact of BHC risk-weighted capital ratios. Finally, alternative proxies for BHC 
risk measurement (management) sophistication could be applied.  
Despite these limitations the paper deserves some merits for having contributed to an 
enhanced understanding under which circumstances prudential ratios under Basel II are 
effective in predicting BHC market valuation. 
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Thesis Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation we aimed to study relevant questions related to bank regulation and 
risk management practices in financial institutions. As re-distributors of society savings, 
banks play an essential role for the prosperity of the world economy (Barth, Caprio Jr, & 
Levine, 2008) and recent financial crisis very clearly illustrated that. Thus, bank regulation 
and risk management practices matter.  
This thesis consists of three essays that study the questions how banking regulation 
affects bank behavior and how bank risk management practices impact bank risk of default 
and market valuation.  
The first essay entitled “The choice to adopt risk-sensitive measurement approaches for 
operational risks: the case of Advanced Measurement Approach under Basel II New Capital 
Accord” is designed to study how financial institutions respond to regulation requirements to 
measure operational risks. This study was partly motivated by the lack of previous research 
on the question why financial institutions decide to invest in sophisticated risk management 
systems (Beasley, Clune, & Hermanson, 2005; VanHoose, 2007). Moreover, there is a myth 
that advanced measurement approaches (AMA) lead to lower capital requirements and banks 
that opt for these approaches could gain a competitive advantage compared to competitors 
that adopt standardized methods (BCBS, 2001; Ramadurai, Beck, Olson, & Spring, 2004). 
First, we formulated several hypotheses to determine factors that might influence the banks’ 
choice to adopt advanced approaches for operational risks (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Davila, 
Foster, & Li, 2009; Elizalde & Repullo, 2007; Paape & Spekle, 2012). Second, we performed 
an empirical analysis to examine whether advanced approaches lead to lower capital 
requirements. Our findings revealed that the adoption of sophisticated approaches to measure 
operational risks is motivated by technical and managerial knowledge that banks accumulated 
and the level of equity that banks have before the adoption of advanced measurement 
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methodologies. The size also seemed to impact positively the bank propensity to adopt AMA. 
Furthermore, our analysis revealed that AMA leads to lower capital requirements compared to 
other less sophisticated operational risk measurement approaches.  
In the second essay, entitled “Internal Risk Controls and their Impact on Bank 
Solvency”, we studied how bank risk management systems are designed and how they impact 
bank solvency. To do that, we constructed the Internal Risk Controls Index (IRCI) composed 
of three elements: a) the presence of independent risk management committee on bank board; 
b) executive status of bank chief risk officer; and c) use of risk-sensitive measurement 
techniques (Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid, 2011; Nocco & Stulz, 2006; Stulz, 2008). Results of our 
empirical analysis suggest that more formalized risk controls impact positively bank solvency 
by reducing risk of default. In addition, ownership concentration (Laeven & Levine, 2009; 
Shehzad, de Haan, & Scholtens, 2010) and strict regulatory oversight (Barth et al., 2008) over 
bank capital moderates positively the relation between bank risk management sophistication 
and solvency. Contrarily to that, limitations on activities that bank could practice (Caprio, 
Laeven, & Levine, 2007) and bank growth (Hopkins & Hopkins, 1997) make the internal risk 
controls less efficient.   
Our third essay, “The Impact of the Sophistication of Risk Measurement Approaches 
under Basel II on Bank Holding Companies Value” aims to study whether bank prudential 
indicators determined under Basel II New Capital Accord (Tier 1 ratio and Total capital ratio) 
have an impact on bank market valuation. According to previous research ((Berger, Herring, 
& Szegö, 1995; Ciháck & Schaeck, 2010; Kim & Santomero, 1988), bank capital ratios could 
predict banking crisis. Nevertheless, no study considered the fact that these capital ratios 
could be computed according to different risk-sensitivity degree approaches. We designed our 
study to fill this lack of knowledge. We provide evidence that higher bank capital ratios lead 
to a higher bank market valuation. Nevertheless, the increasing sophistication in measurement 
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approaches to determine these ratios moderates negatively their predictive power. Thus, 
capital ratios computed under standardized approaches predict better bank market valuation. 
Bank regulators and supervisors need to understand better how financial institutions 
manage their risks and how much attention is paid to the risk governance process. The 
monitoring and management of risks occur through a large set of mechanisms whose 
interdependency and effectiveness are not very well known. It appears that higher 
involvement and higher expertise of internal (board of directors) and external (bank regulator) 
supervisory bodies increase the solvency of banks and reduce their risks of default. We hope 
that our findings will make a valuable contribution in the current stream of research on bank 
behavior and the regulation that affects it. 
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